Marshall Breger examines the talmudic approach to the age-old problem of those who take advantage of charitable activities:

Many argue that fraud is the price of doing business, so to speak—that we cannot provide large-scale welfare, food, or health services without accepting a quantum of fraud. . . . The underlying ethical question is this: does the giver, in this case the government, have a duty to ascertain that the applicant is not a fraud? I would think so, and Jewish sources suggest the same answer.

The Talmud records a dispute between Rabbi Huna and Rabbi Yehuda over the question of due diligence in charity. If one person requests food and another requests clothing, do you examine their bona fides? The rabbis differ as to when due diligence is required. Rabbi Huna argues that a request for clothing is sufficiently personally embarrassing that we can assume no one would so “demean” himself if he did not truly need it. In contrast, Rabbi Yehuda argues that no one would beg for food if he were not truly needy, so the beggar who asks for food should not be examined [to determine if he is really in need]. We understand the law to follow Rabbi Yehuda. . . . Most fraud, however, is not connected to food.

The moral obligations of those who administer charitable funds are different. They may have a stewardship duty that individuals may not have, and their money may be limited. Funds that a public charity gives improperly to X means less money for a deserving Y. Administrators of communal funds thus have a duty of due diligence and a duty to prevent fraud. The Shulḥan Arukh, [the 16th-century code of Jewish law], says, “A person should not contribute to a charity fund unless he knows its management is reliable and knows how to conduct the fund correctly.” How much more so for government social-services programs whose funds come from taxpayers.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.