Marshall Breger examines the talmudic approach to the age-old problem of those who take advantage of charitable activities:

Many argue that fraud is the price of doing business, so to speak—that we cannot provide large-scale welfare, food, or health services without accepting a quantum of fraud. . . . The underlying ethical question is this: does the giver, in this case the government, have a duty to ascertain that the applicant is not a fraud? I would think so, and Jewish sources suggest the same answer.

The Talmud records a dispute between Rabbi Huna and Rabbi Yehuda over the question of due diligence in charity. If one person requests food and another requests clothing, do you examine their bona fides? The rabbis differ as to when due diligence is required. Rabbi Huna argues that a request for clothing is sufficiently personally embarrassing that we can assume no one would so “demean” himself if he did not truly need it. In contrast, Rabbi Yehuda argues that no one would beg for food if he were not truly needy, so the beggar who asks for food should not be examined [to determine if he is really in need]. We understand the law to follow Rabbi Yehuda. . . . Most fraud, however, is not connected to food.

The moral obligations of those who administer charitable funds are different. They may have a stewardship duty that individuals may not have, and their money may be limited. Funds that a public charity gives improperly to X means less money for a deserving Y. Administrators of communal funds thus have a duty of due diligence and a duty to prevent fraud. The Shulḥan Arukh, [the 16th-century code of Jewish law], says, “A person should not contribute to a charity fund unless he knows its management is reliable and knows how to conduct the fund correctly.” How much more so for government social-services programs whose funds come from taxpayers.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.