In Modern Orthodox Judaism: A Documentary History, Zev Eleff for the first time has collected the source materials necessary to understand the development of a denomination that, although its adherents account for under 10 percent of affiliated American Jewry, now plays a disproportionate role in American Jewish life. Daniel Ross Goodman praises the book, while noting some serious gaps:

The history of self-consciously “modern” Orthodoxy is inseparable from the history of Yeshiva University, which is a product of the early 20th century. Eleff covers Yeshiva University’s birth, development, and evolution. . . . Of course, the book also contains several key statements from Modern Orthodoxy’s most outstanding spokesmen: the great halakhist and thinker Rabbi Joseph B. Soloveitchik, [the movement’s most prominent rabbi until his death in 1993], and Rabbi Norman Lamm, who served as the president of Yeshiva University from 1976 to 2003. . . .

Although Rabbi Lamm has been a central figure of inestimable importance to Modern Orthodoxy for nearly seven decades, graduates of Yeshiva University, and anyone even tangentially connected to the institution, are well aware of the fact that it has not been Lamm but rather Yeshiva University’s rashey yeshivah—authoritative halakhists and brilliant talmudists like Hershel Schachter, Mordechai Willig, [and others]—who have, arguably, had a more direct impact on the lives of thousands upon thousands of American Modern Orthodox Jews. It is surprising then, that a volume that features so many texts related to Yeshiva University all but completely excludes figures who can be said to have been the university’s most influential rabbis.

When it comes to Modern Orthodoxy’s present challenges, Goodman finds Eleff better attuned:

The ideology of Modern Orthodoxy, undergirded by Soloveitchik’s distinctive blend of existentialism and neo-Kantianism, is a difficult one to grasp. Most people prefer clear lines and black-and-white differentiations to living with complexity, and it doesn’t help matters that even many of those rabbinic leaders who understand Soloveitchik’s philosophy and embody its values, like Rabbi Lord Jonathan Sacks, do not identify themselves as Modern Orthodox.

This, combined with growing pressure from its right and left flanks, the prohibitive cost of Modern Orthodox life, widespread theological uncertainty, and a continuous “brain drain” in which many of the most committed American Modern Orthodox Jews leave for Israel—Modern Orthodox Jews have the highest rates of aliyah among all American Jews—means that the movement’s future will likely be as ambiguous and complicated as its complex, tension-filled philosophy.

If there’s one lesson to be learned from the history of the Israel-Arab conflict, it’s never to be confident that an end is in sight. Ehud Yaari nevertheless—and with all due caution—points to some noteworthy developments:

The absolute primacy of “armed struggle” in Palestinian discourse has discouraged any serious attempt to discuss or plan for a future Palestinian state. Palestinian political literature is devoid of any substantial debate over what kind of a state they aspire to create. What would be its economic, foreign, and social policies?

One significant exception was a seminar held by Hamas in Gaza—under the auspices of the late Yahya Sinwar—prior to October 7, 2023. The main focus of what was described as a brainstorming session was the question of how to deal with the Jews in the land to be liberated. A broad consensus between the participants was reached that most Israeli Jews should be eradicated or expelled while those contributing to Israel’s success in high tech and other critical domains would be forced to serve the new Palestinian authorities.

Yet, the ongoing aftershocks from the ongoing war in Gaza are posing questions among Palestinians concerning the viability of armed struggle. So far this trend is reflected mainly in stormy exchanges on social-media platforms and internal controversies within Hamas. There is mounting criticism leveled at the late Mohammad Deif and Yahya Sinwar for embarking upon an uncoordinated offensive that is resulting in a “Second Nakba”—a repeat of the defeat and mass displacement caused by launching the war in 1948.

To be sure, “armed struggle” is still being preached daily to the Palestinian communities by Iran and Iranian proxies, and at least half the Palestinian public—according to various polls—believe it remains indispensable. But doubts are being heard. We may be reaching a point where the Palestinians will feel compelled to make a choice between the road which led to past failures and an attempt to chart a new route. It will certainly require time and is bound to cause fractures and divisions, perhaps even a violent split, among the Palestinians.