In many prayerbooks that follow the traditions of Middle Eastern Jewry, as well as of some Ḥasidim, it is common to find a diagram of a seven-branch menorah (like the one found in the two temples) inscribed with biblical or liturgical verses. Such pictures go back to the Middle Ages, when early Jewish mystics began to ascribe kabbalistic significance to one of the oldest and most enduring Jewish symbols. Naturally, as Chen Malul explains, many focused on the mystically meaningful number seven and its relation to the s’firot, or divine emanations connecting God’s essence to the world:

Rabbi Asher Ben-David, a kabbalist who lived in the first half of the 13th century in Provence, suggested that the menorah’s candles “hint at the seven edges,” referring to the seven lower s’firot.

The seven branches of the menorah were interpreted as the seven lower divine emanations, divided into two groups of three. At their center is the s’firah of tiferet (glory), . . . the middle branch that divides the two halves. Whereas [the Castilian] kabbalist, Joseph ben Abraham Gikatilla, focused on the materials from which the menorah was made, the kabbalists who interpreted the menorah as a symbol of the s’firot focused on the material that lights it—the oil. The oil and the light of the menorah provided a solution to the great question of the Kabbalah: how do we reconcile the [unity of] God with the ten s’firot of the kabbalists?

With their characteristic love of metaphors, the kabbalists saw the image of abundant oil being poured into the finite vessels on each branch, and then being lit aflame, as the perfect symbol of God’s infinite essence being “constricted” in the more finite forms of the s’firot.

Between December 27 and January 6, terrorists in Gaza fired rockets at Israel almost every night. On Monday, one rocket struck a home in the much-bombarded town of Sderot, although no one was injured. The rocket fire had largely halted last spring, and for some time barrages were often the result of Israeli forces closing in a Hamas unit or munitions depot. But the truth—which gives credence to Ran Baratz’s argument in his January essay that the IDF is struggling to accomplish its mission—is that Hamas has been able to rebuild. Yoni Ben Menachem writes that the jihadist group has been “producing hundreds of new rockets using lathes smuggled into tunnels that remain operational in Gaza.” Moreover, it has been replenishing its ranks:

According to Israeli security officials, Hamas has recruited approximately 4,000 new fighters over the past month. This rapid expansion bolsters its fighting capabilities and complicates Israel’s efforts to apply military pressure on Hamas to expedite a hostage deal. Hamas’s military recovery has allowed it to prolong its war of attrition against the IDF and adopt tougher stances in hostage negotiations. The funds for this recruitment effort are reportedly from the sale of humanitarian-aid packages, which Hamas forcibly seizes and resells in Gaza’s markets.

In fact, Ben Menachem writes, Hamas’s rocket fire is part of the same strategy:

By firing rockets, Hamas seeks to demonstrate its resilience and operational capability despite the IDF’s prolonged offensive. This message is aimed at both Gaza’s residents and the Israeli public, underscoring that Hamas remains a significant force even after enduring heavy losses [and] that Israel cannot easily occupy this region, currently a focal point of IDF operations.