Over the past three decades, the proportion of Americans who say that they have no religion at all has risen steeply, from about 5 percent to about 25 percent. Numerous social scientists, journalists, and clergymen have commented on the growing numbers of these “nones” (as demographers have dubbed them), but Stephen Bullivant adds something new in his book Nonverts: The Making of Ex-Christian America. Mark Movsesian writes in his review:

What makes his book original and worthwhile, in addition to the engaging writing and interesting case studies, is [Bullivant’s] focus on an important factor that scholars sometimes overlook. The vast majority of nones, about two-thirds or three-quarters, weren’t born that way. They made a conscious choice to disaffiliate from the faith traditions in which they were raised. They converted, in other words, from having a religion to not having one: they are, in his phrase, “nonverts.” Focusing on nonverts specifically, rather than nones generally, is a useful way to understand the changes that are roiling American culture.

Bullivant rejects the conventional view that nonverts tend to come from the ranks of people whose religious affiliation was indifferent to begin with—those who were Christians in name only. Many nones “were once genuinely believing and practicing—even ‘painfully devout,’” he writes. It isn’t simply weak Christians who are drifting away, but true believers. As a consequence, he believes, the crisis facing American Christianity is real and worse than many would like to admit.

Bullivant is quick to point out that American Christianity, even conservative Christianity, is by no means dead. American Christianity still has many millions of followers and great spiritual resources. Indeed, traditional religions in general have shown some surprising resilience lately. As Bullivant points out, the culture wars have done wonders for ecumenism, encouraging conservative followers of many faith traditions—Catholics, evangelicals, Mormons, Orthodox Jews, and so on—to make a common cause. Still, Bullivant’s basic point, that “America is demonstrably becoming less religious than it was,” seems correct. Nonverts give a good sense of exactly what is going on.

Two weeks ago, a terrorist—most likely working for Hizballah—managed to cross into Israel from Lebanon and plant an explosive device near Megiddo that wounded a civilian. The attack, according to Matthew Levitt, is a sign of the Iran-backed militia’s increasing willingness to challenge the tacit understanding it has had with the IDF for over a decade. Such renewed aggression can also be found in the rhetoric of the group’s leaders:

In the lead-up to the 2006 war, [Hizballah’s] Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah famously miscalculated how Israel would respond to the cross-border abduction of its soldiers. According to Israeli analysts, however, he now believes he can predict the enemy’s behavior more accurately, leading him to sharpen his rhetoric and approve a series of increasingly aggressive actions over the past three years.

Nasrallah’s willingness to risk conflict with Israel was partly driven by domestic economic and political pressures. . . . Yet he also seemed to believe that Israel was unlikely to respond in a serious way to his threats given Hizballah’s enlarged precision-missile arsenal and air-defense systems.

In addition to the bombing, this month has seen increased reports of cross-border harassment against Israelis, such as aiming laser beams at drivers and homes, setting off loud explosions on the Lebanese frontier, and pouring sewage toward Israeli towns. Hizballah has also disrupted Israeli efforts to reinforce the security barrier in several spots along the Blue Line, [which serves as the de-facto border between Lebanon and the Jewish state].

This creeping aggressiveness—coupled with Nasrallah’s sense of having deterred Israel and weakened its military posture—indicate that Hizballah will continue trying to move the goalposts.