Reviewing Julian Baggini’s How to Think like a Philosopher: Twelve Key Principles for More Humane, Balanced, and Rational Thinking, John Wilson writes:

The first of the twelve “Key Principles” Baggini wants to impart to his readers is “Pay Attention.” Certainly paying attention is a good rule to follow, whether while making coffee or reading former President Barack Obama’s banal comments regarding book bans. But this is pretty thin gruel. After reading this chapter, I took another look at the gushing endorsements on the back of the book: embarrassing stuff. The “Key Principle” explored in the second chapter is “Question Everything (Including Your Questions).”

Here Baggini illustrates his point by citing the case of devoutly Catholic Michael Dummett, whom he describes as “a giant in the philosophy of language” who “was not as self-doubting as he should have been,” and for whom, “[p]hilosophical doubt stopped at the church door.” Wilson responds:

I don’t think Baggini has earned the right to patronize Michael Dummett, not to mention “religious believers” in general, but it’s particularly striking that he does so after telling readers to question their own questions, advice he fails to heed himself. A more accurate title for this book would have been “How to Think Like an Imaginary Generic Philosopher as Conceived for This Project by Julian Baggini.” But that isn’t very catchy.

One closing thought. Baggini begins every chapter with a quotation from Dostoevsky. I was baffled by this strategy, because there seems to be a flagrant contradiction between the anodyne advice Baggini dispenses and the sarcastic, twisty intelligence of the Russian novelist. If any reader solves this puzzle, I hope he or she will let me know.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.