While credos and catechisms were unknown to the rabbis of the Talmud, some medieval Jewish thinkers sought to identify certain beliefs as foundational and necessary to adherence to the Jewish religion. Most famous of these was Moses Maimonides, who summed up thirteen such principles in one of his early works, and codified theological axioms in his legal magnum opus. Dovid Campbell examines some later rabbis who took a contrary position:

One of the earliest and most powerful challenges to Maimonides’ project came from Rabbi Ḥasdai Crescas (1340–1410). Striking at the root, Crescas claimed that the entire notion of commanded belief was incoherent. Unlike our actions, our beliefs are not something we experience as being chosen. We do not choose to believe that cats exist or that two plus two equals four. Beliefs like these are simply the natural consequences of the facts and experiences we have acquired. It is therefore inconceivable that the Torah would legislate a commandment regarding belief, a commandment we cannot choose to obey or disobey.

Over the centuries, Crescas has found himself in good company. . . . Perhaps the most surprising support for Crescas comes from someone who ostensibly set out to defend Maimonides’ thirteen principles: Don Isaac Abarbanel (1437–1508). While upholding the idea that Exodus 20:2 (“I am the Lord your God who brought you out of the land of Egypt, the house of bondage”) presents us with a biblical commandment, Abarbanel also concedes to Crescas that beliefs are ultimately involuntary and therefore not subject to command. His compromise position, which he attributes to Maimonides himself, presents us with a radically different understanding of what the Torah expects from us.

Abarbanel argues that while beliefs themselves are natural consequences of perceived evidence, the acquisition and investigation of that evidence is certainly a volitional process. It is this process of inquiry—and only this process of inquiry—that is commanded here by the Torah, and our efforts to arrive at ideal beliefs through this process are the sole determinants of our Divine reward (or punishment). In other words, the resulting beliefs are not our problem.

If there is to be peace, Palestinians will have to unlearn the hatred of Israel they have imbibed during nearly two decades of Hamas rule. This will be a difficult task, but Cole Aronson argues, drawing on the experiences of World War II, that Israel has already gotten off to a strong start:

The population’s compliance can . . . be won by a new regime that satisfies its immediate material needs, even if that new regime is sponsored by a government until recently at war with the population’s former regime. Axis civilians were made needy through bombing. Peaceful compliance with the Allies became a good alternative to supporting violent resistance to the Allies.

Israel’s current campaign makes a moderate Gaza more likely, not less. Destroying Hamas not only deprives Islamists of the ability to rule—it proves the futility of armed resistance to Israel, a condition for peace. The destruction of buildings not only deprives Hamas of its hideouts. It also gives ordinary Palestinians strong reasons to shun groups planning to replicate Hamas’s behavior.