While Judaism, Christianity, and Islam all venerate martyrs, the term means something very different in each religion. Malka Simkovich argues that the two books of Maccabees—considered part of the Old Testament by many Christian denominations, but excluded from the Jewish Bible—introduced the idea to Judaism. In turn, they exerted much influence on early Christian writers, who heavily emphasized martyrdom. By contrast, Simkovich writes, the rabbinic tradition tended to downplay martyrdom.

Take, for instance, the Talmud’s exegesis of the verse, “As for Your sake we are killed all the day long; we are reckoned as sheep for the slaughter” (Psalms 44:23). It first understands these words as referring to those who give their life for God, and then presents other readings:

This entire set of interpretations, which offer an alternative to the martyrdom stories—circumcision, teaching ritual slaughter in a dangerous way, and exhaustion by constant study—downplays the virtue of literal martyrdom. Nevertheless, the rabbis don’t dismiss its value altogether.

Dying for a cause was a Greek ideal, and it is thus not surprising that the Hellenistic 2Maccabees is sympathetic to this concept. . . . For the rabbis, dying for God was theoretically an admirable thing, but in practice, they wished to limit this to the occasional exceptional story, and not encourage their followers to pursue a martyr’s fate.

In short, the rabbinic ideal finds holiness in dying for one’s faith, but something even greater in living for it.

Ron Ben-Yishai, reporting from a visit to IDF forces in the Gaza Strip, analyzes the state of the fighting, and “the persistent challenge of eradicating an entrenched enemy in a complex urban terrain.”

Hamas, sensing the war’s end, is mounting a final effort to inflict casualties. The IDF now controls 65 percent of Gaza’s territory operationally, with observation, fire dominance, and relative freedom of movement, alongside systematic tunnel destruction. . . . Major P, a reserve company commander, says, “It’s frustrating to hear at home that we’re stagnating. The public doesn’t get that if we stop, Hamas will recover.”

Senior IDF officers cite two reasons for the slow progress: meticulous care to protect hostages, requiring cautious movement and constant intelligence gathering, and avoiding heavy losses, with 22 soldiers killed since June.

Two-and-a-half of Hamas’s five brigades have been dismantled, yet a new hostage deal and IDF withdrawal could allow Hamas to regroup. . . . Hamas is at its lowest military and governing point since its founding, reduced to a fragmented guerrilla force. Yet, without complete disarmament and infrastructure destruction, it could resurge as a threat in years.

At the same time, Ben-Yishai observes, not everything hangs on the IDF:

According to the Southern Command chief Major General Yaron Finkelman, the IDF is close to completing its objectives. In classical military terms, “defeat” means the enemy surrenders—but with a jihadist organization, the benchmark is its ability to operate against Israel.

Despite [the IDF’s] battlefield successes, the broader strategic outcome—especially regarding the hostages—now hinges on decisions from the political leadership. “We’ve done our part,” said a senior officer. “We’ve reached a crossroads where the government must decide where it wants to go—both on the hostage issue and on Gaza’s future.”