As Washington tries to revive peace talks, a plan developed by General John Allen will likely return to the table. That plan, introduced a year ago, involves a gradual withdrawal of the IDF from the West Bank in favor of “a combination of Palestinian Arab forces, international monitors, and technology.” Whatever its political merits might be, such a plan, argues Colonel Richard Kemp, is strategically foolish, leaving Israel’s eastern border open to attack from Iran, Islamic State, or some other regional enemy. Nor would Allen ever suggest such a plan for the fight against IS, which he currently commands. Kemp writes:

Despite the determination of so many in the West erroneously to view the Israel-Palestine conflict as a mere territorial dispute that could be settled if only the so-called “occupation” ended, the forward defensive measures necessary for other Western nations are necessary for Israel as well. The stark military reality is that Israel cannot withdraw its forces from the West Bank—either now or at any point in the foreseeable future.

For those willing to see with clarity and speak with honesty, that conclusion has been obvious for many years. It is even more obvious, perhaps, for leaders with direct responsibility—such as General MacArthur had in Australia in 1942—than for those who do not have to live with the consequences of their actions—such as General Allen in Israel in 2013.

Yesterday, the Iranian foreign minister flew to Geneva to meet with European diplomats. President Trump, meanwhile, indicated that cease-fire negotiations might soon begin with Iran, which would presumably involve Tehran agreeing to make concessions regarding its nuclear program, while Washington pressures Israel to halt its military activities. According to Israeli media, Iran already began putting out feelers to the U.S. earlier this week. Aviram Bellaishe considers the purpose of these overtures:

The regime’s request to return to negotiations stems from the principle of deception and delay that has guided it for decades. Iran wants to extricate itself from a situation of total destruction of its nuclear facilities. It understands that to save the nuclear program, it must stop at a point that would allow it to return to it in the shortest possible time. So long as the negotiation process leads to halting strikes on its military capabilities and preventing the destruction of the nuclear program, and enables the transfer of enriched uranium to a safe location, it can simultaneously create the two tracks in which it specializes—a false facade of negotiations alongside a hidden nuclear race.