Hamas is now rated as the world’s second-richest terror group, just behind the oil-soaked Islamic State. It has amassed its wealth through smuggling, donations large and small, and protection rackets. Nor have its leaders missed the opportunity to line their own pockets. (The extensive holdings of Khaled Meshal, the head of Hamas, include several high-rise buildings in Qatar.) Ultimately, according to Moshe Elad, the terror group’s fortune is the product of a political culture of corruption and patronage:

The race to obtain powerful positions in the Palestinian Authority began in 1994, with the implementation of the Oslo accords. The government that emerged from that process looks more or less like that of most Arab regimes: it is centralized and corrupt, it lacks effectiveness, bribery plays a very important role in society, and nepotism is prevalent, with just a few families or relatives benefiting from state monopolies on basic services and commodities. . . .

By June 2007, after Hamas took over Gaza through a violent coup, more significant amounts of money began to arrive from the same Islamic countries, reflecting the donors’ desire that Gaza should be run according to Islamic sharia law. A huge fundraising campaign was also launched in Western countries, mainly the United States and Europe, which raised hundreds of millions of dollars that passed through the hands of Dr. Mousa Abu Marzook, the chair of the Hamas political bureau at that time.

According to a Texas federal court record from 2003, Abu Marzook was convicted of illegal funds transfer to every single district in the West Bank, from Jenin in the north to Hebron in the south. Beginning in the 1990s and during every fiscal year, he has transferred millions of dollars, claiming that these funds were for welfare and relief projects while in fact they have been used to compensate suicide bombers’ families and to rehabilitate wounded and invalid terrorists.

Considering the current state of Israel-Arab relations, Ghaith al-Omari writes

First and foremost, no ceasefire will be possible without the release of Israeli hostages and commitments to disarm Hamas and remove it from power. The final say on these matters rests with Hamas commanders on the ground in Gaza, who have been largely impervious to foreign pressure so far. At minimum, however, the United States should insist that Qatari and Egyptian mediators push Hamas’s external leadership to accept these conditions publicly, which could increase pressure on the group’s Gaza leadership.

Washington should also demand a clear, public position from key Arab states regarding disarmament. The Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas endorsed this position in a June letter to Saudi Arabia and France, giving Arab states Palestinian cover for endorsing it themselves.

Some Arab states have already indicated a willingness to play a significant role, but they will have little incentive to commit resources and personnel to Gaza unless Israel (1) provides guarantees that it will not occupy the Strip indefinitely, and (2) removes its veto on a PA role in Gaza’s future, even if only symbolic at first. Arab officials are also seeking assurances that any role they play in Gaza will be in the context of a wider effort to reach a two-state solution.

On the other hand, Washington must remain mindful that current conditions between Israel and the Palestinians are not remotely conducive to . . . implementing a two-state solution.