When Israel struck a Hizballah convoy on the Syrian side of the Golan Heights last week, killing several of the terror organization’s senior figures and at least one Iranian general, it was doing more than merely seizing an opportunity, argues Tony Badran:

With the real prospect of a nuclear Iran on the horizon, no Israeli government can afford to have the Iranian Revolutionary Guards set up base in the Golan. Ultimately, this was the point Israel wanted to make—not just to Tehran, but to Washington as well. . . .

Recognizing that [Hizballah secretary-general Hassan] Nasrallah faces severe limits as to what he can do in response, they have called his bluff in a most humiliating manner.

This message is also intended for the White House. The Obama administration’s de- facto embrace of Iran and acceptance of its expanded domain in the Levant has put the U.S. at odds with Israel’s interests. With this strike against senior Iranian officers, Israel also sent a message to President Obama: “Your accommodation with Iran will not come at our expense.”

Robert Clark explains why the resumption of hostilities is both just and necessary:

These latest Israeli strikes come after weeks of consistent Palestinian provocation; they have repeatedly broken the terms of the cease-fire which they claimed they were so desperate for. There have been numerous [unsuccessful] bus bombings near Tel Aviv and Palestinian-instigated clashes in the West Bank. Fifty-nine Israeli hostages are still held in captivity.

In fact, Hamas and their Palestinian supporters . . . have always known that they can sit back, parade dead Israeli hostages live on social media, and receive hundreds of their own convicted terrorists and murderers back in return. They believed they could get away with the October 7 pogrom.

One hopes Hamas’s leaders will get the message. Meanwhile, many inside and outside Israel seem to believe that, by resuming the fighting, Jerusalem has given up on rescuing the remaining hostages. But, writes Ron Ben-Yishai, this assertion misunderstands the goals of the present campaign. “Experience within the IDF and Israeli intelligence,” Ben-Yishai writes, “has shown that such pressure is the most effective way to push Hamas toward flexibility.” He outlines two other aims:

The second objective was to signal to Hamas that Israel is not only targeting its military wing—the terror army that was the focus of previous phases of the war up until the last cease-fire—but also its governance structure. This was demonstrated by the targeted elimination of five senior officials from Hamas’s political and civilian administration. . . . The strikes also served as a message to mediators, particularly Egypt, that Israel opposes Hamas remaining in any governing or military capacity in post-war Gaza.

The third objective was to create intense military pressure, coordinated with the U.S., on all remaining elements of the Shiite “axis of resistance,” including Yemen’s Houthis, Hamas, and Iran.