Despite American claims that Syria gave up its chemical-weapons program in 2013, there is now overwhelming evidence that Bashar al-Assad still has such weapons and is using them regularly. Dany Shoham explains, noting implications for the Iran deal:

Increasingly worried about his military position, Assad could expand the employment of chemical weapons (chiefly chlorine, during the last year) in order aggressively to defend his core territory. VX [gas], in addition to sarin, could also be very useful for that purpose. . . . If this option becomes necessary for his survival, and is the only option open to him, he will expectedly exercise it—international opinion be damned. . . .

[T]he Syrian regime has repeatedly exploited . . . the civil war and the confrontations with Islamic State (IS) and the rebels as an excuse for impeding inspections activities. Regime representatives have been able to prevent the inspectors from reaching a specific location by simply stating that it is too dangerous. If an inspection team ignores this advice, there are a number of options to ensure it does not reach its destination, the ultimate one being a physical attack, deniable under the “fog” of the civil war. . . .

The employment of weaponized chlorine by Syrian helicopters is almost routine, and, although forbidden, is tolerated by the international community. It has proved to be effective, usually dropped [on targets] in barrels. . . . IS [also] has deployed chlorine gas-based chemical weapons against Iraqi government forces, Syrian government forces, and Syrian opposition forces, and has used unidentified chemical weapons against Kurds in Kobane.

Taking a broader perspective, there are lessons to be drawn from this Syrian weapons-monitoring experience and the current debate over the P5+1 accord with Iran. . . . Effective implementation of the Iran nuclear deal is subject to good intelligence and effective monitoring. The reluctance of the international community to act forcibly regarding the inspections regime in Syria, in particular with respect to investigating its undeclared chemical-weapons capabilities, is a very bad sign.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.