Yes, argues Matthew Kroenig; what’s more, it can be done without starting a war:

The first step to unwinding the Iran nuclear deal in a responsible manner is to establish a clear objective. That objective cannot be merely to punish Iran. The goal must be to reach a better deal, one that actually prevents Iran from building nuclear weapons. . . .

[O]n day one of his or her term, the new president can reinstate by executive order any sanctions that were suspended by the Obama administration. He or she can also put an immediate halt to the unfreezing of any still-frozen Iranian assets. Finally, he or she can cease the use of executive waiver authority, in order effectively to reinstate past congressional sanctions on Iran.

The next and most difficult step will be working with allies and partners to reinstate international and multilateral sanctions against Iran. Critics of this approach have argued that the rest of the world will not support continued [or renewed] sanctions, . . . but this is incorrect. It takes the United States, a global superpower, to lead on issues of nuclear nonproliferation.

Examining the effects of Iran’s decision to launch nearly 200 ballistic missiles at Israel on October 1, Benny Morris takes stock of the Jewish state’s strategic situation:

The massive Iranian attack has turned what began as a local war in and around the Gaza Strip and then expanded into a Hamas–Hizballah–Houthi–Israeli war [into] a regional war with wide and possibly calamitous international repercussions.

Before the Iranians launched their attack, Washington warned Tehran to desist (“don’t,” in President Biden’s phrase), and Israel itself had reportedly cautioned the Iranians secretly that such an attack would trigger a devastating Israeli counterstrike. But a much-humiliated Iran went ahead, nonetheless.

For Israel, the way forward seems to lie in an expansion of the war—in the north or south or both—until the country attains some sort of victory, or a diplomatic settlement is reached. A “victory” would mean forcing Hizballah to cease fire in exchange, say, for a cessation of the IDF bombing campaign and withdrawal to the international border, or forcing Iran, after suffering real pain from IDF attacks, to cease its attacks and rein in its proxies: Hizballah, Hamas, and the Houthis.

At the same time, writes Morris, a victory along such lines would still have its limits:

An IDF withdrawal from southern Lebanon and a cessation of Israeli air-force bombing would result in Hizballah’s resurgence and its re-investment of southern Lebanon down to the border. Neither the Americans nor the French nor the UN nor the Lebanese army—many of whose troops are Shiites who support Hizballah—would fight them.