Pakistan has routinely targeted various terrorist groups operating within its borders, but its overall strategy, argues Bill Reggio in recent congressional testimony, is to support several other jihadist organizations both at home and in Afghanistan. Among the most prominent of these is Jaish-e-Mohammed, which was involved in the kidnapping and murder of Daniel Pearl, and its ally Lashkar-e-Taiba (LeT):

LeT operates openly inside Pakistan and has offices throughout the country. . . .[Its] headquarters, [located] near Lahore, is a sprawling complex that is used to indoctrinate future jihadists before they are sent off for military training. . . .

[LeT’s] terrorist infrastructure was used to conduct . . . terrorist attacks in India and Afghanistan. The most prominent attack took place in Mumbai, when a suicide assault team fanned out across the city and targeted multiple locations, including a theater, a train station, hotels, and a Jewish center, killing 164 people. The attack lasted for three days.

Indian intelligence traced phone calls back to handlers in Pakistan as the assault was ongoing. The handlers directed its fighters to execute non-Muslims, often brutally, and laughed when their instructions were carried out. After the attack, Interpol issued arrest warrants for two serving senior Pakistani army officers and a retired major.

Despite LeT’s overt ties to al-Qaeda and its campaign of terror in India and Afghanistan, the Pakistani government refuses to crack down on this group.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.