Should the U.S. Learn to Live with Assad?

Given the many victories won by Bashar al-Assad and his allies in Syria over the past year, a growing consensus among pundits and foreign-policy experts holds that America and Europe have no choice but to put up with his continued rule—and with a permanent Iranian and Russian presence in the country. Frederic Hof is unconvinced:

Only by returning to the totally discredited belief that what happens in Syria stays in Syria could [this defeatist approach] be remotely defensible as the basis for policy. Syria will continue to roil politically even if all armed opponents of the regime were to surrender today. Try as he may, Assad will not be able to kill, torture, or terrorize quickly or thoroughly enough to command cooperation, much less obedience. And the Kremlin’s concern for the Syrian economy and its rehabilitation extends no farther than whatever morsels—oil and gas fields particularly—can be picked off by the Russian oligarchy. Putin calculates that what passes for the West, given its fear of refugee flows, will pay for Syria’s reconstruction and will do so through the Assad regime. If he is right, then Western taxpayers will hemorrhage euros and dollars indefinitely, with little to show for the expenditure.

He may well be right. A policy that “gets used” to Assad while chuckling over the mess the Russians have presumably bought themselves simply extends the American-led, European-abetted collapse of the West in Syria. . . .

Even if the West adheres to its morally vacuous and politically disastrous determination to do nothing to complicate or mitigate mass homicide in western Syria, it can—at least in principle—encourage and permit a governance alternative to Assad to emerge in Syria east of the Euphrates River, where the finishing military touches are being applied to Islamic State (IS). Iran, Russia, and the regime are alarmed by this possibility, and for good reason. A civilized Syrian alternative to Assad, particularly one arising from adept American diplomacy squaring the circle between Turkey and Syrian Kurds, could be attractive to all Syrians save the innermost circle of family and entourage. The absent alternative has been the missing anchor that has kept Assad afloat.

Whether the alarm of America’s adversaries over Washington’s proclaimed determination to stabilize eastern Syria is justified remains to be seen. The seven-year collapse of the West in Syria has fueled Russian ambitions globally and Iranian ambitions regionally. Without real resources, patience, and determination, that collapse will continue and accelerate.

Read more at Atlantic Council

More about: Bashar al-Assad, Iran, Kurds, Russia, Syrian civil war, Turkey, U.S. Foreign policy

For the Sake of Gaza, Defeat Hamas Soon

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.

Read more at Commentary

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Joseph Biden