Ron Ben-Yishai examines the two “vectors” that will determine how Israel will retaliate:

One vector is the need to deter Iran. The ayatollahs did what they’ve never done before: deliberately attacked Israel, aiming to cause significant damage and undermine its citizens’ security. If Israel fails to respond to this attack aggressively, the ayatollahs and their allies in [what they call] the Axis of Resistance—as well as regional countries willing to normalize their relations with Israel—may see it as a weakness.

Israel also has an interest in threatening the survival of Tehran’s regime by exposing its weakness. But this is where the influence of the second vector comes into play, which is no less important and is perhaps even more so: the aggressive demand by the United States, the UK, France, Germany, and Canada that Israel refrain from a disproportionate response that could endanger the region’s stability. Such a regional war would also serve Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar in Gaza.

Therefore, Israel has an interest in responding to the Western demand and returning to focus on the wars in Gaza and the northern border, leaving the schooling of Iran for another opportunity. In any case, response and revenge are dishes best served cold. It’s better to plan them well to ensure their effectiveness, even if it takes time and is done covertly.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.