Jay Winik’s 1944 presents itself as an admiring biography of a segment of Franklin D. Roosevelt’s career, but also contains a forceful indictment of his failure to take direct action to help the Jews in Hitler’s Europe. In reviewing the book, Terry Teachout connects this failure with the basic attributes of the president’s personal and political character:

Well aware of the persistent prevalence of anti-Semitism among American voters, [Roosevelt] was prepared to do no more [in response to reports about the mass murder of the Jews] than allow the Allies to issue a joint declaration condemning German conduct as “bestial.” Nevertheless, the State Department continued to stand in the way of refugee relief, and Roosevelt declined to make any strong public statement on the subject.

Not until January 1944 did he set up a War Refugee Board whose mission was “to rescue victims of enemy oppression in imminent danger of death.” . . . But he appears to have taken no part in the subsequent War Department debate over whether to bomb Auschwitz to stop the killings. In the end, no such bombing took place, and Winik claims that there “is little doubt that the refusal to directly bomb Auschwitz was the president’s decision or at least reflected his wishes.” Other historians differ on whether FDR was in fact consulted on the matter, or whether bombing would have made a difference; but one thing is sure: it was never even tried. . . .

Roosevelt’s genius—and his tragedy—was his ruthless pragmatism, his seemingly infallible grasp of the limits of political power. For all the passion with which he would later speak of the horrors of the poverty that he longed to ameliorate, he was at the outset of his career the opposite of what we now call a “conviction politician.” Rarely would he put more than a sliver of his own carefully hoarded power at risk in the service of the ideals that he claimed to espouse.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.