Since 1960, the Anne Frank House in Amsterdam has been the city’s only major monument to the destruction of its Jewish community during the Shoah. That changed this year, when the city council approved construction of a wall commemorating the approximately 102,000 Dutch Jews killed at the hands of the Nazis, and a National Holocaust Museum opened its doors. Nina Siegal describes the significance of these new efforts to preserve the realities of the country’s wartime history:

Between 75 and 80 percent of the Netherlands’ Jews were killed during the war, the highest rate in Western Europe. . . . By comparison, neighboring Belgium lost about 40 percent of its Jewish population, and France lost about 25 percent. . . .

Beginning in 1943, about 34,000 Dutch Jews were sent to the Sobibor death camp in Nazi-occupied Poland, and only eighteen survived. . . . This relatively unknown camp accounted for about a third of the Dutch Jewish victims of the Holocaust . . . ; Auschwitz accounted for most of the others. . . .

The Anne Frank House, which had 1.2 million visitors last year, is one of the most popular attractions in the Netherlands. . . . But those who have promoted the new projects fear that people may come away from her [story] with the impression that most Dutch citizens were protective of their Jewish neighbors, and that the Dutch resistance was more effective than it was.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.