On December 11, 1917—the second day of Hanukkah—British troops marched into Jerusalem after fierce fighting with Ottoman forces. Britain’s victory was decisive not just for the course of World War I, but also for Jewish history. Larry Domnitch writes:

The commander and chief [of Britain’s Egyptian Expeditionary Force], General Edmund Allenby, respectfully entered its walls by foot through the Jaffa gate as the city’s 34th conqueror. Excited crowds lined Jerusalem’s streets to welcome the city’s liberators. Their very presence signified an end to the terrible suffering the people of Jerusalem had endured during the war.

One British officer described his entry into Jerusalem and the reception by its residents, “People of all ages and apparently of all nationalities, thronged the roadway, crowded at their doors and windows, and squeezed themselves on the roofs of their houses. Swarms of children, Arab, Jew, and Christian, ran with us as we marched along, and the populace clamored to any point of vantage, waving and clapping their hands, cheering and singing. Jews clad in European dress came running up, singled out any one of us, wrung him by the hand, and—talking excitedly in broken English—said that they, the people of Jerusalem, had been waiting for that two-and-a-half years.

Rabbi Joseph H. Hertz, the chief rabbi of the British Empire issued a statement linking the British entry into Jerusalem to the holiday of Hanukkah, “Jerusalem which for ages has been the majestic pole of love and reverence of the world is now in British hands. And this soul thrilling news reaches us on the day that the Jews are celebrating the Maccabean festival. On this day 2,080 years ago, the Maccabees freed the Holy City from the heathen oppressor and thereby changed the spiritual future of humanity. Who knows but that today’s victory may form as glorious a landmark in the history of mankind.”

The British victory of course paved the way for the implementation of the Balfour Declaration, which had been issued just a few weeks earlier.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.