While discoveries from the Second Temple era (516 BCE–70 CE) and the later Roman period are quite in common in Israel, findings from the First Temple period (destroyed in 587 BCE) are much rarer. Archaeologists recently identified such an item, dating to the 7th or 8th century BCE. Israel Hayom reports:

The clay seal contains ancient Hebrew writing indicating it belonged to the “governor of the city” of Jerusalem, the highest municipal position during that time. “This is the first time such a sealing has been found in proper archaeological excavations,” Shlomit Weksler-Bdolah, the lead excavator said, “it supports the biblical record of there being a governor of Jerusalem during the First Temple period.”

Experts say the seal, which depicts two figures facing each other below the inscription, was likely attached to an important letter or document. . . . The area where it was found near the Western Wall is believed to have been inhabited by high-ranking officials based on this seal and other artifacts found previously.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.