The prominent journalist James Fallows has made a habit of complaining whenever Jews mention the Holocaust. James Kirchick attempts to figure out why:

Fallows’ annoyance at receiving letters from fearful Jews is matched by his confidence that the current situation in the Middle East bears no relation whatsoever to the fact that the Jews of Europe were exterminated en masse in living memory while the rest of the world . . . did nothing to stop it. . . . . “Rationally these situations have nothing in common—apart from the anti-Semitic rhetoric,” [Fallows] wrote on March 3, casually writing off the [Iranian] mullahs’ frequently expressed anti-Semitism, and their suborning terrorist organizations that wage war on Jews both inside and out of the Jewish state, as just so much talk. . . .

Fallows’ argument has the odd effect of demanding that Jews treat what are obviously serious and heartfelt threats as though they aren’t serious at all—a demand that it is hard to imagine Fallows or anyone else making of any other group that had any practical or historical cause to feel threatened. Instead of being a reason why Jews might legitimately be scared, the Holocaust is perversely transformed into a reason why Jews—alone among all other groups of people on the planet—should rise above petty concerns about their own “existential” chances, or else become the targets of Fallows’ annoyance. . . .

Interestingly, there are some people whose obsessive invocations of the Holocaust are fine with Fallows. In 2013, he rose to the defense of Max Blumenthal, author of a book about Israel that depicts Jews as Nazis and their state as akin to the Third Reich. Asked about such comparisons at an event, “Blumenthal’s answer was that he used these terms purposefully, to draw the universals from the ‘never again’ message of the Holocaust,” Fallows wrote approvingly. . . . Fallows is fine when the likes of Max Blumenthal invoke the Holocaust as a means of calling Jews the new Nazis; he just has a problem when Jews mention it in conjunction with Iran, or in any other connection that might impede the Obama Administration’s Middle East policies.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.