The prominent journalist James Fallows has made a habit of complaining whenever Jews mention the Holocaust. James Kirchick attempts to figure out why:

Fallows’ annoyance at receiving letters from fearful Jews is matched by his confidence that the current situation in the Middle East bears no relation whatsoever to the fact that the Jews of Europe were exterminated en masse in living memory while the rest of the world . . . did nothing to stop it. . . . . “Rationally these situations have nothing in common—apart from the anti-Semitic rhetoric,” [Fallows] wrote on March 3, casually writing off the [Iranian] mullahs’ frequently expressed anti-Semitism, and their suborning terrorist organizations that wage war on Jews both inside and out of the Jewish state, as just so much talk. . . .

Fallows’ argument has the odd effect of demanding that Jews treat what are obviously serious and heartfelt threats as though they aren’t serious at all—a demand that it is hard to imagine Fallows or anyone else making of any other group that had any practical or historical cause to feel threatened. Instead of being a reason why Jews might legitimately be scared, the Holocaust is perversely transformed into a reason why Jews—alone among all other groups of people on the planet—should rise above petty concerns about their own “existential” chances, or else become the targets of Fallows’ annoyance. . . .

Interestingly, there are some people whose obsessive invocations of the Holocaust are fine with Fallows. In 2013, he rose to the defense of Max Blumenthal, author of a book about Israel that depicts Jews as Nazis and their state as akin to the Third Reich. Asked about such comparisons at an event, “Blumenthal’s answer was that he used these terms purposefully, to draw the universals from the ‘never again’ message of the Holocaust,” Fallows wrote approvingly. . . . Fallows is fine when the likes of Max Blumenthal invoke the Holocaust as a means of calling Jews the new Nazis; he just has a problem when Jews mention it in conjunction with Iran, or in any other connection that might impede the Obama Administration’s Middle East policies.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.