The recent string of terror attacks in Egypt suggests that President Sisi’s extended crackdown has had little success, and that the jihadists are growing stronger. Elliott Abrams comments on the implications for Egypt, and for Israel:

The Egyptian army has given no evidence that it knows how to combat the terrorists effectively. [And] the terrorists are getting better at it. Last year they appeared as a ragtag bunch holding Kalashnikovs. . . . Now they have attacked several targets in one day in a well-coordinated movement, they wear uniforms, and they have more advanced equipment such as anti-tank missiles. This is the Islamic State [as] we have come to know [it] in Iraq.

There are [also] connections between the terrorists in Sinai and Hamas in Gaza. There are accusations that Hamas has done some training of these jihadists in Sinai, has provided them with funds, and has given medical treatment to wounded jihadists in Gaza hospitals.

Israelis know that developments in Sinai will present threats to Israel sooner rather than later. One must hope that in addition to protecting their border, the Israelis are giving the Egyptians some advice on counter-terror strategies. President Sisi’s overall strategy is a blunt one: repression. It is not going to work—in Sinai or anywhere in Egypt. This is partly because the targets of repression are not only the terrorists but any critics of the government. The government of Egypt now has about 40,000 political prisoners, and it is crushing all political activity—moderate, secular, liberal, democratic as well as extremist. That’s a formula for instability in the medium and perhaps even short term.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.