Despite wreaking much mayhem and garnering much attention, the movement to boycott, divest from, and sanction Israel has so far failed both at economic warfare and at influencing perceptions of the Jewish state—at least according to survey data. In fact, writes Jonathan Marks, a recent Gallup poll notes that, if anything, Americans’ sympathy for Israel has increased:

[T]he young have been special targets of the BDS movement, treated every year to “Israel apartheid week,” struggles against Zionist hummus, and divestment campaigns. Indeed, young people have been less sympathetic than older people to Israel in the recent past. Nonetheless, this year, 54 percent [of young respondents] reported sympathizing more with Israel [than with the Palestinians]; 23 percent sympathized more with the Palestinians. In 2005, 51 percent reported sympathizing more with Israel. . . . In short, the BDSers have not been able to budge opinion among the young so far. . . .

That does not mean one need not be concerned about the boycott movement, both because there may be subtle effects that the polls are missing and because it seems likely that the failure of BDS to take hold has something to do with determined opposition to it. It does mean, however, that there is no reason to despair about reports of BDS “momentum” which, at least so far, seems to be a myth.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.