Earlier this month, the Middle East Quartet—a group comprising representatives of the U.S., Russia, the EU, and the UN, self-tasked with bringing a resolution to the Israel-Palestinian conflict—produced a report that, inter alia, complained of the growth of the “West Bank settler population” since 2009 and the construction of new houses for Jews in the area. But, argues Ahron Shapiro, the statistics cited by the Quartet are misleading, perhaps mendaciously so. In fact, he writes, the settlements are demographically “treading water.” And that’s not the only problem:

[T]he Quartet report fails to explain . . . that all Israeli West Bank settlements are in [what is designated by the Oslo Accords as] Area C, and it failed to differentiate between construction in settlement blocs and in isolated settlements. This is no mere issue of semantics and is as equally relevant for settlement blocs as for Israel’s east Jerusalem neighborhoods.

The entire raison d’être for the mutually agreed land swaps that everyone from President Obama to the Arab League have referred to as part of any potential peace agreement between the Palestinians and Israel is to help resolve the settlement issue. They were designed to do so by allowing Israel to keep its existing east Jerusalem neighborhoods and strategic settlement blocs [in area C] where most settlers live and in return give the Palestinians land inside of pre-1967 Israel as compensation.

If settlement blocs and east Jerusalem neighborhoods aren’t the land the Security Council and Quartet had in mind for land swaps, just what exactly were they expecting to swap? And if they are the land destined for swaps, what exactly is the problem if Israel builds there? . . .

[Furthermore], since taking office in 2009, Prime Minister Netanyahu has built fewer homes in Israeli settlements in the West Bank than previous prime ministers going back to the 1990s. . . . [Finally], the long-term trend has shown proportionally fewer housing starts in Israeli settlements than elsewhere in Israel, and also fewer housing starts in proportion to the Israel’s settler population compared to the general population. . . .

[A]ccording to the Oslo Accords and its signed addenda and additions—legally binding documents recognized under international law—Israel has the right to exercise complete administrative and security control over Area C. . . .

If Israel is forced to conclude that any such agreements signed by Israel as part of a peace deal may fail to be upheld and supported by the international community, how can it sign a [new] peace deal which will almost certainly require international security guarantees?

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.