Over the past eight years, America has been steadily disengaging from the Middle East. Among the results, writes Efraim Inbar, are Iranian regional ascendancy, the likelihood of further nuclear proliferation, the rise of Islamic State, an emboldened Russia, and bloody chaos in Iraq, Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere. And then there are the consequences for Israel:

The perception that Washington will come to Israel’s aid in times of need has been a longstanding and important component of Jerusalem’s ability to project a deterrent threat. The new perception of the U.S. administration as a vacillating ally damages that deterrent capability. In addition, Washington’s attempt to compensate its Arab allies for the Iranian nuclear deal by providing them with the latest state-of-the-art weapons erodes Israel’s qualitative advantage.

[But] the U.S. exit from the Middle East ironically also increases Israel’s leeway to do as it sees fit. It is burdened with less of an obligation to weigh the consequences of its own actions on U.S. interests and personnel in the region. Moreover, if the next American administration employs the logic of “offshore balancing,” whereby one country uses favored regional powers to check the rise of potentially hostile powers, Washington’s dependence on Jerusalem is likely to increase, as Israel is the strongest and friendliest military power in a highly volatile region.

Lastly, Washington’s disengagement from the Middle East appears to close the book on the longstanding U.S. support for liberty and for democratic movements around the globe. It undermines the relatively small and weak pro-democratic forces in the Arab world, which need greater U.S. involvement and support for their causes. . . .

For the time being, there is no alternative to a responsible and well calibrated U.S. role in world affairs. An assertive U.S. position is also important for spreading the values for which [America] stands—democracy and the free market. Abdicating this role is simply irresponsible.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.