The United Nations Security Council passed a resolution on Friday pronouncing illegal any Jewish settlement in territory Israel acquired in 1967. Breaking with longstanding policy, the U.S., rather than exercising its customary veto, abstained from voting. As the Israeli ambassador Danny Danon remarked the resolution “sends a message” to Palestinian leaders that they “should continue on the path of terrorism and incitement [and] continue to seek meaningless statements from the international community.” In fact, argue Elliott Abrams and Michael Singh, the Security Council’s action only makes peace more difficult:

[T]he resolution fails to distinguish between construction in the so-called blocs—that is, settlements west of Israel’s security barrier in which about 80 percent of settlers live—and construction east of the barrier. Building in the major blocs is relatively uncontroversial in Israel and rarely the subject of Palestinian protests. . . .

[It also] demands the cessation of all settlement activities everywhere. This is unnecessary and unrealistic—Israelis will not bring life to a halt in towns that no one disputes they will keep—and is more likely to obstruct than facilitate the revival of peace talks. . . .

For the resolution does indeed dictate terms to Israel, not merely condemn settlement activity. It adopts, as noted above, the position that the 1967 lines, rather than today’s realities, should form the basis of talks—despite the fact that many Israeli communities east of those lines are decades old and that Jews have had a near-continuous presence in the West Bank for thousands of years.

It implicitly prejudges the disposition of east Jerusalem—one of the most contentious issues dividing the parties—by characterizing Israeli construction there as settlement activity, a stance Israelis reject. The resolution would demand an absolute halt to construction in east Jerusalem, even in the Jewish Quarter of the Old City, something no Israeli government ever would agree to do.

Yet the resolution is conspicuously silent on Israeli concerns. There is no call for other states to recognize Israel’s existence—much less its status as a Jewish state—and end the conflict against it. . . . Peace in the Middle East will not be accomplished through a UN vote. Rather, it will require renewed U.S. leadership in the region and the rebuilding of relationships of trust with all of our partners there.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.