Today’s anti-Semitism, writes Shmuel Trigano, even if it is not so different from the anti-Semitism of previous eras, finds its main expression in objection to the Jewish state’s existence. But while the Muslim variant is explicable in that it is rooted in religious rejection of Jewish sovereignty in the midst of the Middle East, the Western variety is harder to understand:

Western anti-Zionism . . . predicates itself on “compassion” and memory of the Holocaust. Not only does Western anti-Zionism accuse the Jews and the state of Israel of cynically exploiting the memory of the Holocaust; not only does it equate the Holocaust with the Palestinian “Nakba” (caused by the failed war of annihilation against the Jews in Israel) by establishing the Jews as modern-day Nazis, but the West has become a world where monuments and museums are erected to preserve the memory of the Holocaust, while the state of Israel is simultaneously outcast and stigmatized under the auspices of the boycott, divestment, and sanctions movement and legal warfare. Memory of the Holocaust is permitted; the right to the Western Wall is not.

The French [statesman] General Charles de Gaulle expressed this view perfectly in his outrageous comments following the Six-Day War, when he asserted that Israel had crossed its moral and political boundaries. The existence of the Jewish state, according to de Gaulle, was a form of compensation for the Holocaust and reparation for Europe’s crime against the Jewish people. With that, the Jews—in his mind—do not have the right to [violate European-imposed] boundaries or deem themselves sovereign or independent, and if they dare think otherwise, they will lose the support of France, which will no longer come to help them if they are in danger of being destroyed. . . .

At the core of [this sort of anti-Semitism], which [is just the old anti-Semitism] cloaked in different attire, is the humiliated Jew, stripped of legitimacy, denied any justification for living according to the accepted norms of the times, [and] attacked in a tangible way.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.