Noting the “absurdity” of America’s current policy, Robert Satloff calls on Donald Trump to make good on his campaign promise to relocate the American embassy to Israel’s capital, urges that he announce his intention to do so quickly, and provides detailed advice on how the plan should be executed:

Presidents of both parties who made and then broke [their] promise [to move the embassy] were evidently convinced that [doing so] would ignite such outrage in Arab and Muslim-majority countries and trigger such violence among Palestinians themselves that the costs outweighed the benefits. Opponents of the embassy move have always cited this argument as though it were a self-evident truth. This analysis, however, takes ominous warnings by certain Middle East leaders at face value, builds on what is essentially a condescending view of Arabs and Muslims that assumes they will react mindlessly to incendiary calls to violence, and does not reflect a net assessment that includes the potential impact of subtle, creative, and at times forceful American diplomacy.

Both the residence and embassy should be in west Jerusalem, that part of the city Israel has controlled since 1948–49, to underscore that this move repairs a historic injustice dating to Israel’s founding: that the United States has never formally recognized any part of Jerusalem as Israel’s capital. . . .

[But] any assessment of the move . . . needs to place appropriate value not just on repairing a historic injustice but on the powerful signal broadcast to the Middle East—and the wider world—that the new administration is determined to chart a new course in the region, one in which fulfilling commitments to allies is a top priority. . . .

[It will be] useful for the Trump team to point out [to the leaders of Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, and Jordan] that the embassy move reflects something that all these countries should appreciate—a reaffirmation of America’s commitment to allies and its willingness to take bold steps to give meaning to those alliances. More generally, to the extent U.S. envoys can signal a renewed commitment to broader U.S. leadership in the region, the more likely it is that Arab leaders will be willing to use means at their disposal to rein in obstreperous elements in their societies eager to stoke popular outrage at the embassy move.

For more than a year, the Iran-backed Houthis have been launching drones and missiles at ships traversing the Red Sea, as well as at Israeli territory, in support of Hamas. This development has drastically curtailed shipping through the Suez Canal and the Bab al-Mandeb Strait, driving up trade prices. This week, the Trump administration began an extensive bombing campaign against the Houthis in an effort to reopen that crucial waterway. Burcu Ozcelik highlights another benefit of this action:

The administration has a broader geopolitical agenda—one that includes countering China’s economic leverage, particularly Beijing’s reliance on Iranian oil. By targeting the Houthis, the United States is not only safeguarding vital shipping lanes but also exerting pressure on the Iran-China energy nexus, a key component of Beijing’s strategic posture in the region.

China was the primary destination for up to 90 percent of Iran’s oil exports in 2024, underscoring the deepening economic ties between Beijing and Tehran despite U.S. sanctions. By helping fill Iranian coffers, China aids Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in financing proxies like the Houthis. Since October of last year, notable U.S. Treasury announcements have revealed covert links between China and the Houthis.

Striking the Houthis could trigger broader repercussions—not least by disrupting the flow of Iranian oil to China. While difficult to confirm, it is conceivable and has been reported, that the Houthis may have received financial or other forms of compensation from China (such as Chinese-made military components) in exchange for allowing freedom of passage for China-affiliated vessels in the Red Sea.