On Friday in Gaza City, two men assassinated Mazen Fuqha: a high-ranking member of Hamas formerly imprisoned in Israel for his role in a 2001 bus bombing that killed nine; in 2011, he was released with dozens of other terrorists in exchange for the captive Israeli soldier Gilad Shalit. Although it is unclear who was responsible for Fuqha’s death, Hamas is blaming it on Palestinians collaborating with Israel. The question now is whether and how Hamas will respond, and where that response could lead. Yoni Ben Menachem writes:

Fuqha moved freely around Gaza without bodyguards, demonstrating the complacency of senior Hamas figures who were convinced that they were safe from any interference. This sense of security for Hamas officials has now been shattered. From now on, Hamas officials will begin to move around with armed escorts and security guards. . . .

Fuqha was released together with Yahya Sinwar, recently elected as the new Hamas leader of Gaza. Now, many view Sinwar as the next possible target. He is known for his radical line against Israel, and Fuqha’s killing poses a leadership challenge to Sinwar, who must now decide on a response against Israel. Until now, Sinwar had been very careful not to violate the cease-fire agreement, brokered by Egypt between Israel and Hamas after the 2014 Gaza war, . . . despite recent Israeli air-force strikes in Gaza in response to the firing of six rockets by Salafist-jihadist groups. . . .

The likelihood that Hamas will start firing rockets at Israel in response is low, since Hamas is busy with internal elections and rebuilding in Gaza. In recent days, the Palestinian government has begun to distribute $40 million, which Saudi Arabia has donated, to hundreds of families in Gaza to enable them to rebuild their homes that were damaged in the 2014 war. Rocket fire into Israel would result in a strong Israeli response and another round of fighting that is not currently in Hamas’s interest.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that the military wing of Hamas will respond with terrorist acts perpetrated by its “dormant cells” in the West Bank against Israelis living there or inside the Green Line. This underlines the importance of tightening the security coordination between Israeli and Palestinian security forces. The Israel Defense Forces are preparing, in any case, for the possibility of attacks ahead of the Passover holiday, and now it is essential to be vigilant.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.