Evaluating the possible effects of Emmanuel Macron’s victory over Marine Le Pen in France’s recent presidential election, Oded Eran and Adi Kantor write:

Most French Jews voted for Macron . . . even if only as the lesser of two evils. Together with his recognition of the role played by the French government during World War II in causing injustice and suffering to French Jews, Macron also alleged that the Jewish community has lagged behind in assimilating into French society, and that Muslim and Jewish schools were teaching resentment of the French Republic because this is commanded in the Quran and the Torah.

French Jews will certainly be encouraged by Macron’s decisive victory, but like Macron, they cannot ignore the fact that one third of the electorate supported Le Pen [with her connections to anti-Semites and Holocaust deniers and her apparent refusal to acknowledge the Vichy regime’s collaboration with the Nazis].

Macron’s attitude toward Israel [similarly] includes both approval and criticism. On one of his visits to Israel, he referred to strengthening relations between Israel and France in entrepreneurship, innovation, and research, and called for denying support to the Boycott, Divest, and Sanction (BDS) movement. Macron has also refrained from recognizing a Palestinian state, though he expressed opposition to Israeli settlements on the West Bank. In view of the weighty tasks facing him as a new and inexperienced president, especially in the international arena, it is doubtful whether he will devote any effort to rejuvenating his predecessor’s initiative aimed at restarting the political process between Israel and the Palestinians.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.