For decades, America’s refusal to establish its embassy in Israel’s capital has been justified on the grounds that moving it there would unleash Arab violence. Hillel Frisch notes that, four months after the White House announced the move, such fears have been exposed as unfounded:

The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, probably the most reputable source of data on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, has for many years tabulated significant Palestinian terrorist attacks in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. . . . There were thirteen attacks, [according to Amit], in the period before the decision [to move the embassy] (that is, from August to early December 2017), compared with fourteen attacks from December 2017 to early April 2018. The number of terrorist attacks in both four-month periods paled before the period covering April through July 2017, in which there were 38 attacks, considerably more than the two periods together since then. . . .

But perhaps data for serious terrorist attacks are not the appropriate measure to assess instability? . . . The number of arrests Israel makes is [probably a better] indicator of levels of other forms of violence and protest. . . . Addameer, a Palestinian NGO concerned with the welfare of Palestinian prisoners in Israeli jails, records . . . the total number of prisoners in Israeli detention centers on a monthly basis. The numbers through March 2018 show no significant increase. . . . If anything, the figures indicate a slight decline in arrests.

Perhaps the best indication that President Trump’s decision did not bring Palestinians to confront Israeli security in the streets is Hamas’s “March of Return” campaign that began at the end of March on “Land Day” and is supposed to continue up to May 14, the date of the establishment of the state of Israel, which Palestinians call “the Nakba,” the catastrophe. If Trump’s decision was so inflammatory, why the need for a new campaign theme to mobilize Palestinians to violence?

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.