Last month, when a group of students at Williams College attempted to form the Williams Initiative for Israel (WIFI), a new organization, the student council voted against granting it official recognition. K.C. Johnson, having examined the video of the first of the two meetings during which the council reached this decision, and a complete transcript of the second, finds evidence of blatant disregard for democratic principles, “appalling” ignorance of Middle Eastern history, and statements dramatically minimizing the scope of the Holocaust. He writes:

Shutting down the council’s usual livestream [for the second session] was justified, one college legislator noted, to accommodate “the students who are afraid to speak out because of the pro-Israel lobby in this country and the things that they are known to achieve when it comes to their campus activism.” A colleague presented the obvious response: “Why are people so worried about the things they’re going to say? Are they that hateful?”

The latter question proved prescient. Three themes dominated the council debate. The first was an attempt to use the powers of student government, which previously had recognized a branch of [the radical anti-Israel group] Students for Justice in Palestine, to limit campus discourse about Israel. . . . Though constricting the spectrum of acceptable positions on Israel would seem to undermine principles of free speech, one critic of WIFI argued otherwise, [asserting that] two sides should present “clashing free ideas,” after which the council should “vote in [favor of] what we think are the best ideas and . . . vote out what we think are ideas worthy of being discarded.” Defining free speech as tyranny of the majority is a mainstream view on too many contemporary campuses. . . .

One student acknowledged the “horrible conditions that Jewish people experienced” during the Holocaust, but claimed that Palestinians currently were “even experiencing worse.” Why? Unlike the seemingly unending Israeli occupation of the West Bank, “the purpose of these [World War II] ghettos were basically to control, segregate, and separate the Jewish people for [only] short periods of time.” . . .

As the decision generated national and international attention, . . . eleven Williams students wrote in the Williams Record, the campus newspaper, . . . that WIFI supporters violated a condition of “free speech on campus” by not showing “basic respect” for their viewpoint—presumably by disbanding the group.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.