The ongoing coalition negotiations among Israeli political parties have returned to the fore the possibility of annexing or otherwise changing the legal status of the Jordan River Valley, which has been under Jerusalem’s control since 1967. While agreeing that the IDF’s presence in the area is essential to the Jewish state’s security, opponents of the move argue that it would cause an unnecessary rift with Israel’s eastern neighbor. To Nadav Shragai, this risk has been highly inflated:

[T]here is a wide discrepancy between how Jordan openly conducts itself with regard to Israel—using critical . . . rhetoric aimed at pacifying its Palestinian majority—and how the kingdom acts behind the scenes.

Jordan has swallowed a lot of toads over the years to maintain the informal relationship with Israel that is vital to its own continued existence. Jordan enjoys economic, military, and intelligence cooperation with us that is often critical to its interests. Jordan also holds special status on the Temple Mount, and has in effect become Israel’s silent partner in managing affairs there. The way Jordan sees it, that status is of almost existential importance, given the place al-Aqsa holds in the [national] narrative and consciousness of the Hashemite dynasty and many of the kingdom’s residents. Jordan will think twice before putting that at risk.

The Jordanians prefer that the IDF remain a buffer between them and the Palestinians in the West Bank, and it’s convenient for them that this buffer exist without Israeli sovereignty. But even if Israel applies sovereignty, it doesn’t seem as if Jordan will burn its bridges. We might see the recall of the ambassador and even the peace treaty being suspended, but in essence, we can assume that Israel-Jordanian relations, and both countries’ mutual interests, will not change. The Jordanians might [keep their alliance with Israel out of the public eye] for a while, but nothing more.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.