In a detailed analysis of the Biden administration’s emerging approach to foreign affairs in general, and the Middle East in particular, Douglas Feith sees a general inclination to pay less attention to the region, with two exceptions: nuclear negotiations with Iran and the Israel-Palestinian peace process. As far at the former is concerned, Feith concludes that “President Biden is not interested in taking advantage of Iran’s current economic vulnerabilities [and] has not shown an intention to fix the nuclear deal’s major flaws.” As for the latter, Feith offers some advice:

Palestinian strategy [has long] aimed for international pressure to do to Israel what such pressure did to South Africa’s apartheid regime—to bring it to its knees and compel it to relinquish power. The strategy became bankrupt, however, and the recent normalization deals exposed its hopelessness. If the Palestinians stick with it, it is they and not the Israelis who will suffer increasing marginalization.

The world incentivizes Palestinian leaders to perpetuate the conflict with Israel. Because they are widely celebrated as embodying an important, as-yet-unfulfilled national cause, those leaders are granted extraordinary diplomatic attention and generous financial aid, much of which they divert improperly to build huge houses for themselves in Ramallah, Gaza, and elsewhere. Were they to settle the conflict, reducing themselves to mere functionaries of a state in poor condition, they would lose much of what they value in life—international solicitude, money, and personal pride in heading what they see as a noble revolutionary struggle against a hated enemy.

Israel’s new friends in the Arab world have an interest in changing the economic and political landscape of Palestinian politics. They may be able to do so in cooperation with the United States and those foreign powers that still provide financial aid to the Palestinians. They may be able to empower Palestinians who are not enmeshed in the perverse incentive system that requires perpetuation of the conflict against Israel. Therein lies the best hope for progress toward peace.

If the Biden team has its eye on the prize, it will direct its energies not at recreating the old “peace process” but at working with Arab states to encourage the rise of new Palestinian leaders.

Feith’s essay can be found on p. 27 of the document linked below.

Before exploding electronics in Lebanon seized the attention of the Israeli public, debate there had focused on the Philadelphi Corridor—the strip of land between Gaza and Egypt—and whether the IDF can afford to withdraw from it. Egypt has opposed Israeli control of the corridor, which is crucial to Hamas’s supply lines, and Egyptian objections likely prevented Israel from seizing it earlier in the war. Yet, argues Mariam Wahba, Egypt in the long run only stands to lose by letting Hamas use the corridor, and has proved incapable of effectively sealing it off:

Ultimately, this moment presents an opportunity for the United States to hold Egypt’s feet to the fire.

To press Cairo, the United States should consider conditioning future aid on Cairo’s willingness to cooperate. This should include a demand for greater transparency and independent oversight to verify Egyptian claims about the tunnels. Congress ought to hold hearings to understand better Egypt’s role and its compliance as a U.S. ally. Despite Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s nine trips to the Middle East since the start of the war, there has been little clarity on how Egypt intends to fulfill its role as a mediator.

By refusing to acknowledge Israel’s legitimate security concerns, Egypt is undermining its own interests, prolonging the war in Gaza, and further destabilizing its relationship with Jerusalem. It is time for Egyptian leaders either to admit their inability to secure the border and seek help from Israel and America, or to risk being perceived as enablers of Hamas and its terrorist campaign.