Created in 2010, the Istanbul Convention is an international treaty for “preventing and combating violence against women and domestic violence,” which some 45, mostly European, countries have signed. Despite support for joining the convention from Israeli politicians—including Foreign Minister Yair Lapid—the Israeli government recently decided to defer doing so for the foreseeable future. Eugene Kontorovich explains the wisdom of this decision:

Violence against women should be dealt with by tougher penalties and better enforcement, not through international virtue signaling. Any useful ideas in the convention can and should be discussed and adopted on their own merits.

Joining the treaty would expose a wide variety of Israeli social policies to scrutiny by the treaty’s monitoring arm, known by its acronym GREVIO. Anti-Israel bias has turned many international monitoring mechanisms, like the UN Human Rights Council, into arenas for condemning Israel for “the occupation.”

Will GREVIO be different? For one, the serving commissioner, Rachel Eapen Paul, worked for many years for a BDS-promoting NGO. Just last month—while a GREVIO member—she addressed a convention of a radically anti-Israel organization that condemns Israel’s “ethnic cleansings” and “colonial policies” in Jerusalem.

Finally, groups lobbying for the convention fail to disclose how much they have to gain from its adoption. Article 9 [of the document] would require Israel to “support” financially NGOs dealing with such issues and make them “partners” in its implementation. That would be good news for . . . a variety of pro-BDS organizations, which would label themselves advocates of Palestinian women’s rights.

On Monday night, the IDF struck a group of Hamas operatives near the Nasser hospital in Khan Yunis, the main city in southern Gaza. The very fact of this attack was reassuring, as it suggested that the release of Edan Alexander didn’t come with restraints on Israeli military activity. Then, yesterday afternoon, Israeli jets carried out another, larger attack on Khan Yunis, hitting a site where it believed Mohammad Sinwar, the head of Hamas in Gaza, to be hiding. The IDF has not yet confirmed that he was present. There is some hope that the death of Sinwar—who replaced his older brother Yahya after he was killed last year—could have a debilitating effect on Hamas.

Meanwhile, Donald Trump is visiting the Persian Gulf, and it’s unclear how his diplomatic efforts there will affect Israel, its war with Hamas, and Iran. For its part, Jerusalem has committed to resume full-scale operations in Gaza after President Trump returns to the U.S. But, Gabi Simoni and Erez Winner explain, Israel does not have unlimited time to defeat Hamas:

Israel faces persistent security challenges across multiple fronts—Iran, the West Bank, Yemen, Syria, and Lebanon—all demanding significant military resources, especially during periods of escalation. . . . Failing to achieve a decisive victory not only prolongs the conflict but also drains national resources and threatens Israel’s ability to obtain its strategic goals.

Only a swift, forceful military campaign can achieve the war’s objectives: securing the hostages’ release, ensuring Israeli citizens’ safety, and preventing future kidnappings. Avoiding such action won’t just prolong the suffering of the hostages and deepen public uncertainty—it will also drain national resources and weaken Israel’s standing in the region and beyond.

We recommend launching an intense military operation in Gaza without delay, with clear, measurable objectives—crippling Hamas’s military and governance capabilities and securing the release of hostages. Such a campaign should combine military pressure with indirect negotiations, maximizing the chances of a successful outcome while minimizing risks.

Crucially, the operation must be closely coordinated with the United States and moderate Arab states to reduce international pressure and preserve the gains of regional alliances.