While demokratiyah has been the motto of the demonstrators who have for the past months gathered daily in Israel’s public places, it is a very specific notion of democracy that they support, one which deviates from the more majoritarian understanding that animates the present government. Arguably that majoritarianism adheres more closely to the vision of David Ben-Gurion. Nir Kedar, in David Ben-Gurion and the Foundation of Israeli Democracy, explores what exactly that vision was. Allan Arkush writes in his review:

If Ben-Gurion’s political theory had to be summed up in a single word, it would be one that is rather difficult to translate: mamlakhtiyut. Kedar, who wrote the book on the subject (in Hebrew), thinks that “civicism” is the best, if awkward, English equivalent. Derived from mamlakhah, the Hebrew word for “kingdom,” it connotes the vital importance of the state, but as Kedar makes clear, Ben-Gurion’s focus on the collective did not override his individualism. Mamlakhtiyut, he writes, “is a political concept that sees the state . . . first and foremost as a framework that places the individual front and center.”

The individual here means all individuals, who should have the freedom to chart their own way in life while participating equally in their own governance. These convictions underlie Ben-Gurion’s insistence on the subordination of the army to democratic government, his strict commitment to the rule of law and freedom of expression, and his depoliticization of the civil service. However, mamlakhtiyut meant more than the empowerment and equality of all citizens; it is also concerned with the way that they relate to each other. They needed to be imbued with “a true sense of belonging to a civil society built on mutual responsibility.”

Kedar shows how, in the spirit of mamlakhtiyut, Ben-Gurion tried to bind Jews of disparate religious orientations and ethnic origins together as Israelis. This entailed, among other things, “tolerance of the religious practices of the new immigrants” in the state’s early years and “support of religious education for children of immigrants who desired it.” Readers who know something of the actual treatment accorded to new immigrants for Arabic-speaking lands in the early 1950s may scoff at these assertions. But they would be mostly wrong to do so.

Tamir Hayman analyzes the latest reports about an offer by Hamas to release three female soldiers in exchange for 150 captured terrorists, of whom 90 have received life sentences; then, if that exchange happens successfully, a second stage of the deal will begin.

If this does happen, Israel will release all the serious prisoners who had been sentenced to life and who are associated with Hamas, which will leave Israel without any bargaining chips for the second stage. In practice, Israel will release everyone who is important to Hamas without getting back all the hostages. In this situation, it’s evident that Israel will approach the second stage of the negotiations in the most unfavorable way possible. Hamas will achieve all its demands in the first stage, except for a commitment from Israel to end the war completely.

How does this relate to the fighting in Rafah? Hayman explains:

In the absence of an agreement or compromise by Hamas, it is detrimental for Israel to continue the static situation we were in. It is positive that new energy has entered the campaign. . . . The [capture of the] border of the Gaza Strip and the Rafah crossing are extremely important achievements, while the ongoing dismantling of the battalions is of secondary importance.

That being said, Hayman is critical of the approach to negotiations taken so far:

Gradual hostage trades don’t work. We must adopt a different concept of a single deal in which Israel offers a complete cessation of the war in exchange for all the hostages.