In the United Kingdom, the National Union of Students (NUS) and its various chapters provide recreational and extracurricular activities on university campuses and serve as student representatives. The NUS is, in addition, an expressly political organization with deep ties to the Labor party. It has also been infected by the same anti-Semitic currents that for some time seized hold of Labor. Last year, it elected as its president Shaima Dallali, who mixes Islamic anti-Semitism into her expressions of hatred of Israel—a habit shared by at least one of her recent predecessors.

Liam Hoare takes a close look at the general climate for Jewish students at British universities, the problems of the NUS, and the results of the recent investigation into the organization commissioned by parliament:

“For at least the last decade, Jewish students have not felt welcome or included” in the NUS, wrote the investigator, Rebecca Tuck. Most significantly, she wrote: “There have been numerous investigations and reviews which have made recommendations to rectify this problem, but their implementation has been inconsistent and institutional memories short-lived.”

She blamed the NUS for failing to show solidarity with Jewish students when faced with anti-Semitism—specifically Israel-related anti-Semitism. A Jewish delegate who attended a 2021 NUS conference for marginalized groups said he felt “very isolated and uncomfortable the whole time and completely on edge” due to Israel-related anti-Semitism. “I am not a Zionist, I even lean anti-Zionist, and even I found the undue focus on Israel and completely one-dimensional discussion of Israel to be completely over the line,” the student told Tuck.

Even when NUS has tried to show support for Jewish students, it has fallen short. Tuck pointed to a period in the spring of 2021 when anti-Semitic incidents spiked on British college campuses during an escalation of tensions between Israel and Hamas and other Palestinian terror organizations. A freshman at the University of Leeds, for example, answered his cell phone to a threatening, pre-recorded message that stated: “I want to shoot all your family, I know your father, I want to put a bullet in your head. I hate you; I hate the Jews.”

Tuck’s report is nonbinding, but the NUS has accepted its findings “in full” and “apologize[d] wholeheartedly and unreservedly to Jewish students.” . . . The question remains whether this time change will be lasting or whether the cycle of hostility toward Jewish students will begin anew.

Below, today’s newsletter will return to some other reflections on the one-year anniversary of the outbreak of the current war, but first something must be said of its recent progress. Israel has kept up its aerial and ground assault on Hizballah, and may have already killed the successor to Hassan Nasrallah, the longtime leader it eliminated less than two weeks ago. Matthew Levitt assesses the current state of the Lebanon-based terrorist group, which, in his view, is now “a shadow of its former self.” Indeed, he adds,

it is no exaggeration to say that the Hizballah of two weeks ago no longer exists. And since Hizballah was the backbone of Iran’s network of militant proxies, its so-called axis of resistance, Iran’s strategy of arming and deploying proxy groups throughout the region is suddenly at risk as well.

Hizballah’s attacks put increasing pressure on Israel, as intended, only that pressure did not lead Israelis to stop targeting Hamas so much as it chipped away at Israel’s fears about the cost of military action to address the military threats posed by Hizballah.

At the same time, Levitt explains, Hizballah still poses a serious threat, as it demonstrated last night when its missiles struck Haifa and Tiberias, injuring at least two people:

Hizballah still maintains an arsenal of rockets and a cadre of several thousand fighters. It will continue to pose potent military threats for Israel, Lebanon, and the wider region.

How will the group seek to avenge Nasrallah’s death amid these military setbacks? Hizballah is likely to resort to acts of international terrorism, which are overseen by one of the few elements of the group that has not yet lost key leaders.

But the true measure of whether the group will be able to reconstitute itself, even over many years, is whether Iran can restock Hizballah’s sophisticated arsenal. Tehran’s network of proxy groups—from Hizballah to Hamas to the Houthis—is only as dangerous as it is today because of Iran’s provision of weapons and money. Whatever Hizballah does next, Western governments must prioritize cutting off Tehran’s ability to arm and fund its proxies.