In the United Kingdom, the National Union of Students (NUS) and its various chapters provide recreational and extracurricular activities on university campuses and serve as student representatives. The NUS is, in addition, an expressly political organization with deep ties to the Labor party. It has also been infected by the same anti-Semitic currents that for some time seized hold of Labor. Last year, it elected as its president Shaima Dallali, who mixes Islamic anti-Semitism into her expressions of hatred of Israel—a habit shared by at least one of her recent predecessors.

Liam Hoare takes a close look at the general climate for Jewish students at British universities, the problems of the NUS, and the results of the recent investigation into the organization commissioned by parliament:

“For at least the last decade, Jewish students have not felt welcome or included” in the NUS, wrote the investigator, Rebecca Tuck. Most significantly, she wrote: “There have been numerous investigations and reviews which have made recommendations to rectify this problem, but their implementation has been inconsistent and institutional memories short-lived.”

She blamed the NUS for failing to show solidarity with Jewish students when faced with anti-Semitism—specifically Israel-related anti-Semitism. A Jewish delegate who attended a 2021 NUS conference for marginalized groups said he felt “very isolated and uncomfortable the whole time and completely on edge” due to Israel-related anti-Semitism. “I am not a Zionist, I even lean anti-Zionist, and even I found the undue focus on Israel and completely one-dimensional discussion of Israel to be completely over the line,” the student told Tuck.

Even when NUS has tried to show support for Jewish students, it has fallen short. Tuck pointed to a period in the spring of 2021 when anti-Semitic incidents spiked on British college campuses during an escalation of tensions between Israel and Hamas and other Palestinian terror organizations. A freshman at the University of Leeds, for example, answered his cell phone to a threatening, pre-recorded message that stated: “I want to shoot all your family, I know your father, I want to put a bullet in your head. I hate you; I hate the Jews.”

Tuck’s report is nonbinding, but the NUS has accepted its findings “in full” and “apologize[d] wholeheartedly and unreservedly to Jewish students.” . . . The question remains whether this time change will be lasting or whether the cycle of hostility toward Jewish students will begin anew.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.