Besides concluding a China-brokered agreement with its traditional rival, Saudi Arabia, Tehran has made overtures to the United Arab Emirates, Bahrain, and Turkey. At the same time, the Islamic Republic has engaged in a campaign of maritime harassment directed at the U.S. and is escalating against Israel with West Bank terror and mischief in southern Lebanon. Kenneth Pollack explains that Iran’s goal of regional domination remains unchanged, and seeks to interpret its recent behavior:

After 40 years of unmitigated subversion and aggression, the Arab states know very well what Iran is capable of—especially if the United States isn’t around to block it. To this real threat, Tehran seems to be adding the inducement of better relations if the Arab world will shed its U.S. dependency and accept Iranian suzerainty instead.

Since the Americans seem ever less interested in the Middle East, Russia is tied down in Ukraine, and China still lacks the military muscle to take over as the regional strongman, a kinder, gentler Iran now seems inviting to frightened Arab states. It is why the new Iranian charm offensive has proven so effective, at least to a limited extent so far.

Meanwhile, Tehran’s continued aggressiveness toward the United States and Israel appears to complement its Arab strategy. Iran likely believes that continued attacks on Washington’s people and interests in the region will help speed the U.S. departure.

As for Israel, heating up the conflict there helps Iran to present the Arab states with a sharper dilemma: you can either join us and have peace and trade, or join Israel and have war. . . . Thus, the dual approach of coddling the Arab states while amplifying attacks on the United States and Israel is probably meant to drive a wedge between the Arab states and Iran’s principal nemeses. . . . What Iran fears most is reconciliation between the United States and its Arab allies, and further rapprochement between them and Israel.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.