In 1993, the Israeli Supreme Court demanded that the Shas-party politician Aryeh Deri be fired from his cabinet post because he was about to be indicted on corruption charges—on the grounds that doing otherwise would be “unreasonable.” Deri is now once again the leader of Shas and, thanks to the bill passed by the Knesset last week that removes the Court’s authority to cancel ministerial appointments on “reasonableness” grounds, is poised to join the cabinet once again. While much attention has been paid to the implications of this development for Israel’s internal affairs, Michael Oren observes that it might profoundly affect foreign policy:

The U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan visited the Saudi kingdom last week and offered Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman security guarantees and U.S. weapon systems in exchange for a normalization deal with Israel. The prince responded favorably, so long as Israel makes a gesture toward the Palestinians.

The focus on Deri’s criminal past has all but obscured his rather moderate views on foreign policy. By having the bill passed and bringing him back, [the Knesset has made it possible for] Deri to serve as a counterweight to Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, paving the way for the gesture toward the Palestinians. If Smotrich or Ben-Gvir threaten to leave the coalition, they would be replaced by Benny Gantz and his National Unity Party—a maneuver that is [possibly] already in the works.

Connecting these three components into one big puzzle will allow President Biden to preside over a peace-signing ceremony on the White House lawn—an optic that he so desperately needs. The Saudis will get the weapons and guarantees they have long asked for, but the big winner will be Israel: not only will it finally see an end to the conflict with the Sunni world, but it will also get access to the massive Saudi economy, and from there to the markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. Israel’s diplomatic, economic, and strategic standing will improve manyfold.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.