In 1993, the Israeli Supreme Court demanded that the Shas-party politician Aryeh Deri be fired from his cabinet post because he was about to be indicted on corruption charges—on the grounds that doing otherwise would be “unreasonable.” Deri is now once again the leader of Shas and, thanks to the bill passed by the Knesset last week that removes the Court’s authority to cancel ministerial appointments on “reasonableness” grounds, is poised to join the cabinet once again. While much attention has been paid to the implications of this development for Israel’s internal affairs, Michael Oren observes that it might profoundly affect foreign policy:

The U.S. national security advisor Jake Sullivan visited the Saudi kingdom last week and offered Crown Prince Mohammad bin Salman security guarantees and U.S. weapon systems in exchange for a normalization deal with Israel. The prince responded favorably, so long as Israel makes a gesture toward the Palestinians.

The focus on Deri’s criminal past has all but obscured his rather moderate views on foreign policy. By having the bill passed and bringing him back, [the Knesset has made it possible for] Deri to serve as a counterweight to Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir, paving the way for the gesture toward the Palestinians. If Smotrich or Ben-Gvir threaten to leave the coalition, they would be replaced by Benny Gantz and his National Unity Party—a maneuver that is [possibly] already in the works.

Connecting these three components into one big puzzle will allow President Biden to preside over a peace-signing ceremony on the White House lawn—an optic that he so desperately needs. The Saudis will get the weapons and guarantees they have long asked for, but the big winner will be Israel: not only will it finally see an end to the conflict with the Sunni world, but it will also get access to the massive Saudi economy, and from there to the markets in Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan. Israel’s diplomatic, economic, and strategic standing will improve manyfold.

On Yom Kippur, Hizballah fired over 200 rockets and drones at Israel, with one drone hitting a retirement home in Herzliya, miraculously without casualties. Yesterday, however, proved less lucky: a drone launched by the Iran-backed group struck a military base, killing four and injuring another 58, about twenty moderately or seriously.

This attack reflects Iranian strategy: Israeli defensive systems are strong, but so are Iranian drones and missiles, and with enough attacks some will get through. As Ariel Kahana writes, such an approach is consistent with Tehran’s desire to fight a war of attrition, denying Jerusalem the chance to strike a decisive blow. Kahana explains how the IDF might turn the tables:

It’s worth noting that Iran’s strategy of wearing down Israel and other U.S. allies in the region is not merely a choice, but a necessity. Militarily, it’s the only card left in Tehran’s hand. Iran neither desires nor possesses the capability to deploy ground forces against Israel, given the vast geographical distance and intervening countries. Moreover, while Israel boasts one of the world’s most formidable air forces, Iran’s air capabilities are comparatively limited.

Israel’s trump card in this high-stakes game is its unparalleled air-defense system. For years, Iran had counted on its network of proxy organizations to provide a protective umbrella against Western strikes. However, a year into the current conflict, this strategy lies in tatters: Hamas is reeling, Hizballah is on the back foot, and the various militias in Iraq and Yemen amount to little more than an irritant for Israel. The result? Iran finds itself unexpectedly exposed.

And when it comes to direct attacks on Israel, Iran’s options may be limited. Its October 1 attack, which used its sophisticated Fateh-2 missiles, was more effective than that in April, but not much more so:

Oded Eilam, drawing on his experience as a former senior Mossad official, . .  estimates [Iran’s] stockpile of these advanced weapons is limited to between 400 and 800. With 200 already expended in a single attack, Iran’s reserves of truly effective missiles may be running low. This raises a critical question: can Iran sustain a prolonged ballistic exchange with Israel? The numbers suggest it’s capacity for attrition warfare may be more limited than it would like to admit.