Examining the record of the Biden administration thus far, Michael Pompeo and Elan Carr notice a pattern of decisions deleterious to the Jewish state. These policies, they argue, are the result of pressure from the left flank of the president’s own party:

The trouble began only three weeks after Inauguration Day, when the administration announced plans to rejoin the United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC). The Council has made Israel-bashing a primary focus, racking up over 100 condemnations of that one country in seventeen years—roughly the same number as for all other countries combined. Had the administration found this disturbing and in need of repair, it could have negotiated conditions for our return. For example, it might have demanded that “item 7,” which mandates a discussion of Israel at every session, be stricken from UNHRC meeting agendas. No such conditions were levied.

In March 2023, President Biden publicly snubbed Benjamin Netanyahu, newly returned to office, and announced that the prime minister would not be receiving an invitation to Washington “in the near term.” The reason given for this rare insult of a close ally is the Netanyahu government’s controversial reforms to Israel’s judicial system. But this explanation was itself an insult, given that the snub came the day after Prime Minister Netanyahu announced the temporary suspension of the legislation.

All of these painful examples pale in comparison with the most dangerous Biden policy affecting Israel, which is his tilt toward the rogue regime in Iran. The Islamic Republic is the world’s chief state sponsor of both terrorism and anti-Semitism, and for years it has been bent on developing nuclear weapons and delivery capabilities that present an existential threat to Israel and our Gulf allies.

The Biden administration has bent over backward to resurrect some new version of the Obama-era [nuclear deal]. . . . As unwise as we believe this to be, the greater outrage is that the Biden team has been rewarding Iran all this time without having concluded any agreement, formal or informal. The administration has been reversing the “maximum pressure” sanctions campaign we had helped to impose during the previous administration—and has received nothing in return.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.