Since October 7, Palestinians in Judea and Samaria have carried out 128 terrorist attacks that the Shin Bet (Israel’s internal security agency) judges “significant.” These include 112 shootings and two rocket launches, but not the many gunfights that have taken place between Israeli forces and local militants. Nevertheless, Hamas has not managed to carry out its plan to spark a mass uprising in the West Bank and draw the Jewish state into a two-front war. Neomi Neumann explains why:

Despite the ongoing violence, the numbers reveal a significant decline in terrorist attacks over the past three weeks compared to the huge spike seen in the first three weeks after October 7, which was three times the average recorded during the same period in 2022. The IDF’s daily operations in the West Bank are having an impact on the frequency and intensity of such incidents—indeed, the killing of senior terrorists, the seizure of arms caches, the introduction of new combat patterns (e.g., aerial fire), and extensive arrests all show that Israel has “taken off the gloves” post-October.

[Meanwhile], the Palestinian Authority (PA) president Mahmoud Abbas and senior Fatah figures have been careful to condemn Israel publicly and to call on the international community to protect Palestinians. . . . Yet beneath this implied support for groups that actively oppose Israeli occupation, many PA officials privately hope that the IDF succeeds in smashing Hamas and killing its leaders—the only scenario in which the PA would be able to return to Gaza.

The best explanation for the relative passivity of most West Bank Palestinians is . . . the traumatic memory of the second intifada, when they paid a huge price but failed to secure significant political achievements after four years of violence.

In other words, contrary to oft-heard assertions that fighting terrorism only creates more terrorists, Israel’s measured application of force has prevented attacks in the both the short and long run.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.