How the “New York Times” Misunderstands Israel’s Intelligence Failure

A recent New York Times article, co-authored by Ronen Bergman, reports that Israeli intelligence knew in advance of Hamas’s plans to carry out an attack along the lines of October 7. While that may be true, writes Edward Luttwak, the Times frames the story as one of sheer incompetence, without considering how military intelligence works, or the nature of the IDF. This result, according to Luttwak, is a “carefully contrived misrepresentation.”

Instead of consisting of active-duty forces that are up and running around the clock, the IDF mostly consists of reserve units. When mobilized for refresher training or to fight a war, the reservists go to their specific depots scattered around the country to collect their uniforms, kit, and weapons—everything from pistols to battle tanks—before moving out as combat units ready for action. That is how a country of some 7 million has more than 635,000 soldiers, airmen, and sailors when fully mobilized.

But there is a major catch: advance warning is needed to mobilize the reserves in time, and even with the best possible intelligence analysts, and all the best satellites, sensors, and computers, the problem is not just hard, . . . it is impossible. Had Israeli intelligence analysis, or the arrival of a complete war plan sold by an enterprising operative, revealed Hamas’s plan for an attack on October 7, the Israelis would have sent much stronger forces to guard the Gaza perimeter.

But then, of course, Hamas spotters would have seen Israeli troops ready to defeat them—and they would have called off the attack altogether. There is worse: once an attack warning is received and reinforcements are deployed so that the enemy calls off its planned attack, the intelligence indicators that got it right will be discredited as false alarms, while the intelligence officers who failed to heed the signs will be the ones everyone listens to the next time around.

Read more at UnHerd

More about: Gaza War 2023, Intelligence, Israeli Security, New York Times, Yom Kippur War

For the Sake of Gaza, Defeat Hamas Soon

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.

Read more at Commentary

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Joseph Biden