A recent New York Times article, co-authored by Ronen Bergman, reports that Israeli intelligence knew in advance of Hamas’s plans to carry out an attack along the lines of October 7. While that may be true, writes Edward Luttwak, the Times frames the story as one of sheer incompetence, without considering how military intelligence works, or the nature of the IDF. This result, according to Luttwak, is a “carefully contrived misrepresentation.”

Instead of consisting of active-duty forces that are up and running around the clock, the IDF mostly consists of reserve units. When mobilized for refresher training or to fight a war, the reservists go to their specific depots scattered around the country to collect their uniforms, kit, and weapons—everything from pistols to battle tanks—before moving out as combat units ready for action. That is how a country of some 7 million has more than 635,000 soldiers, airmen, and sailors when fully mobilized.

But there is a major catch: advance warning is needed to mobilize the reserves in time, and even with the best possible intelligence analysts, and all the best satellites, sensors, and computers, the problem is not just hard, . . . it is impossible. Had Israeli intelligence analysis, or the arrival of a complete war plan sold by an enterprising operative, revealed Hamas’s plan for an attack on October 7, the Israelis would have sent much stronger forces to guard the Gaza perimeter.

But then, of course, Hamas spotters would have seen Israeli troops ready to defeat them—and they would have called off the attack altogether. There is worse: once an attack warning is received and reinforcements are deployed so that the enemy calls off its planned attack, the intelligence indicators that got it right will be discredited as false alarms, while the intelligence officers who failed to heed the signs will be the ones everyone listens to the next time around.

Yesterday I saw an unconfirmed report that the Biden administration has offered Israel a massive arms deal in exchange for a promise not to strike Iran’s nuclear facilities. Even if the report is incorrect, there is plenty of other evidence that the White House has been trying to dissuade Jerusalem from mounting such an attack. The thinking behind this pressure is hard to fathom, as there is little Israel could do that would better serve American interests in the Middle East than putting some distance between the ayatollahs and nuclear weapons. Aaron MacLean explains why this is so, in the context of a broader discussion of strategic priorities in the Middle East and elsewhere:

If the Iran issue were satisfactorily adjusted in the direction of the American interest, the question of Israel’s security would become more manageable overnight. If a network of American partners enjoyed security against state predation, the proactive suppression of militarily less serious threats like Islamic State would be more easily organized—and indeed, such partners would be less vulnerable to the manipulation of powers external to the region.

[The Biden administration’s] commitment to escalation avoidance has had the odd effect of making the security situation in the region look a great deal as it would if America had actually withdrawn [from the Middle East].

Alternatively, we could project competence by effectively backing our Middle East partners in their competitions against their enemies, who are also our enemies, by ensuring a favorable overall balance of power in the region by means of our partnership network, and by preventing Iran from achieving nuclear status—even if it courts escalation with Iran in the shorter run.