How the “New York Times” Misunderstands Israel’s Intelligence Failure

Dec. 11 2023

A recent New York Times article, co-authored by Ronen Bergman, reports that Israeli intelligence knew in advance of Hamas’s plans to carry out an attack along the lines of October 7. While that may be true, writes Edward Luttwak, the Times frames the story as one of sheer incompetence, without considering how military intelligence works, or the nature of the IDF. This result, according to Luttwak, is a “carefully contrived misrepresentation.”

Instead of consisting of active-duty forces that are up and running around the clock, the IDF mostly consists of reserve units. When mobilized for refresher training or to fight a war, the reservists go to their specific depots scattered around the country to collect their uniforms, kit, and weapons—everything from pistols to battle tanks—before moving out as combat units ready for action. That is how a country of some 7 million has more than 635,000 soldiers, airmen, and sailors when fully mobilized.

But there is a major catch: advance warning is needed to mobilize the reserves in time, and even with the best possible intelligence analysts, and all the best satellites, sensors, and computers, the problem is not just hard, . . . it is impossible. Had Israeli intelligence analysis, or the arrival of a complete war plan sold by an enterprising operative, revealed Hamas’s plan for an attack on October 7, the Israelis would have sent much stronger forces to guard the Gaza perimeter.

But then, of course, Hamas spotters would have seen Israeli troops ready to defeat them—and they would have called off the attack altogether. There is worse: once an attack warning is received and reinforcements are deployed so that the enemy calls off its planned attack, the intelligence indicators that got it right will be discredited as false alarms, while the intelligence officers who failed to heed the signs will be the ones everyone listens to the next time around.

Read more at UnHerd

More about: Gaza War 2023, Intelligence, Israeli Security, New York Times, Yom Kippur War

What’s Behind Hamas’s Threat to Stall the Release of Hostages, and How Israel Should Respond

Feb. 12 2025

Hamas declared yesterday that it won’t release more hostages “until further notice.” Given the timing and wording of the announcement—several days before the release was supposed to take place, and speaking of a delay rather than a halt—Ron Ben-Yishai concludes that it is a negotiating tactic, aimed at “creating a temporary crisis to gain leverage.” Therefore, writes Ben-Yishai, “Hamas may reverse its decision by Saturday.” He adds:

Israel cannot afford to concede to Hamas’s demands beyond what is already outlined in the agreement, as doing so would invite continuous extortion throughout the negotiation process, further delaying hostage releases.

The group sees the public outrage and growing calls for action following the release of hostages in severe medical condition as an opportunity to extract more concessions. These demands include not only a rapid start to negotiations on the next phase of the deal and an end to the war but also smaller, immediate benefits, particularly improved conditions for displaced Gazans.

Beyond these tactical objectives, Hamas has another goal—one that Israelis do not always recognize: inflicting psychological pain on the Israeli public. The group benefits from, and perhaps even draws strength from, the anguish and emotional distress in Israel, as well as the testimonies of freed hostages detailing the abuse they endured. Hamas wants these stories to be heard—not only to pressure the Israeli government but also because, in the eyes of its supporters, Israel’s suffering is its ultimate victory.

Read more at Ynet

More about: Gaza War 2023, Hamas, Israeli Security