Increasingly, the U.S. is pressuring Jerusalem to formulate a postwar plan for the Gaza Strip. From Washington or Brussels, the most obvious solution would be to return the territory to the control of the Palestinian Authority (PA), ruled by the aging Mahmoud Abbas. Hussain Abdul-Hussain explains why this would be impossible:

Extremists are likely to pose a persistent threat in postwar Gaza; Abbas’s PA has shown that is something it cannot handle. It has allowed large pockets of the West Bank to become strongholds of Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and other groups. In July, Abbas visited Jenin for the first time in twenty years, after Israel had operated against militants’ strongholds. Abbas’s senior officials were booed and chased out. In the West Bank, Nablus too has become notoriously lawless, allowing for the rise of a new radical militia, the Lion’s Den.

But if not Abbas, then who? Every possibility seems either far-fetched or likely to be disastrous. Abdul-Hussain makes a proposal that could be one of the least-bad options, namely allowing an Arab League force to police the Strip:

Should the Arab League try [to maintain order] in Gaza, the command should be put in the hands of the United Arab Emirates, whose military is among the most capable in the region. The Arab force can help develop and stand up a local security force that can win Israeli trust. The UAE has been the most trustworthy peace partner of Israel among all six Arab nations that have normalized relations with the Jewish state since 1979.What the UAE needs for such an endeavor in Gaza is global and regional cover. Enter Washington and Riyadh, two capitals that can impress on the PA to bestow whatever legitimacy it still has on the new Gazan local government and security force.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.