Signatories to the 1948 Genocide Convention (of which Israel is one) pledge that genocide “is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.” Shany Mor draws the logical conclusion:

Israel’s war in Gaza is not a violation of its commitments as a contracting party to the 1948 Genocide Convention. It is, in fact, a fulfillment of its obligations under the treaty. . . . For Israel to do nothing in the face of Hamas’s actions on October 7, or to cut its actions short and somehow acquiesce to a reality where that orgy of murder, rape, torture, and abduction would recur, would be a violation of the first article of the Convention.

The question of why the Jewish state was on trial two weeks ago at the International Court of Justice cannot be answered by examining Israel’s actions, but the thinking of its accusers. Mor continues:

Hanging over any discussion of Israel and any discussion of Jews and violence is the long, unremitting, and unfading shadow of the Shoah. It is impossible to understand just how much Israel bothers Western intellectuals without understanding how much the Holocaust bothers them. Haunts them. Frightens them. And, occasionally, thrills them.

Hauling the Jews in to plead their case before a special tribunal and face the charge that they are the real Nazis has been the fantasy of every anti-Semite since the first gavel hit a sound block in Nuremberg in 1946. It is the dark fantasy behind the insistence over decades on speaking of controversial Israeli actions always in terms of “war crimes.” This, and not a poor grasp of complex legal arguments, is the reason every Israeli military action in the last half-century has been criticized as “collective punishment” or “disproportionate.”

As long as the Shoah looms large in the civilized conscience, there will be those among us who project our fears and our discomfort in the most transparent way. The damage from this obsession is enormous, both to the cause of human rights and to the people this obsession claims to care about, the still-stateless Palestinians.

Even if the agreement with Hamas to secure the release of some, and possibly all, of the remaining hostages—and the bodies of those no longer alive—is a prudent decision for Israel, it comes at a very high price: potentially leaving Hamas in control of Gaza and the release of vast numbers of Palestinian prisoners, many with blood on their hands. Nadav Shragai reminds us of the history of such agreements:

We cannot forget that the terrorists released in the Jibril deal during the summer of 1985 became the backbone of the first intifada, resulting in the murder of 165 Israelis. Approximately half of the terrorists released following the Oslo Accords joined Palestinian terror groups, with many participating in the second intifada that claimed 1,178 Israeli lives. Those freed in [exchange for Gilad Shalit in 2011] constructed Gaza, the world’s largest terror city, and brought about the October 7 massacre. We must ask ourselves: where will those released in the 2025 hostage deal lead us?

Taking these painful concessions into account Michael Oren argues that they might nonetheless be necessary:

From day one—October 7, 2023—Israel’s twin goals in Gaza were fundamentally irreconcilable. Israel could not, as its leaders pledged, simultaneously destroy Hamas and secure all of the hostages’ release. The terrorists who regarded the hostages as the key to their survival would hardly give them up for less than an Israeli commitment to end—and therefore lose—the war. Israelis, for their part, were torn between those who felt that they could not send their children to the army so long as hostages remained in captivity and those who held that, if Hamas wins, Israel will not have an army at all.

While 33 hostages will be released in the first stage, dozens—alive and dead—will remain in Gaza, prolonging their families’ suffering. The relatives of those killed by the Palestinian terrorists now going free will also be shattered. So, too, will the Israelis who still see soldiers dying in Gaza almost daily while Hamas rocket fire continues. What were all of Israel’s sacrifices for, they will ask. . . .

Perhaps this outcome was unavoidable from the beginning. Perhaps the deal is the only way of reconciling Israel’s mutually exclusive goals of annihilating Hamas and repatriating the hostages. Perhaps, despite Israel’s subsequent military triumph, this is the price for the failures of October 7.