On Monday, the Argentine president-elect Javier Milei made a surprise trip to New York City to visit the grave of the late Lubavitcher rebbe Menachem Mendel Schneerson, of whom he is an admirer. This is just one of many surprising things about Milei, from his prominent sideburns, to his flamboyant speeches, to his commitment to economic liberalism. Ben Cohen explains the Argentinian politician’s Jewish fascinations:

A populist maverick who defines himself as an “anarcho-capitalist” and has been dubbed El Loco (“The Crazy One”) by critics, Milei’s love of Judaism and strong support for Israel were central features of his campaign, demonstrated by the frequent appearance of Israeli flags at his campaign rallies. The new Argentine leader studies Torah with Rabbi Shimon Wahnish, who is based in Buenos Aires, and has openly talked on several occasions about converting to Judaism—adding the caveat that doing so would be impossible if he were elected president, as the demands of the office would be incompatible with observing core Jewish practices like Shabbat, when observant Jews do not use telephones and electronic devices.

Among the first individuals to meet with Milei following his triumph over his left-wing rival Sergio Massa—garnering 56 percent of the votes against 44 percent in the second round of the election—were the Israeli ambassador in Buenos Aires, Eyal Sela, along with a delegation from the AMIA Jewish Center in the Argentine capital.

Milei has also promised to move the Argentinian embassy to Jerusalem, and there is much hope that he will abandon the pro-Iranian policies of his predecessor Alberto Fernández. Fernández helped protect his vice-president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner—who served as the country’s president from 2007 to 2015—from scrutiny over her role in obstructing the investigation into the Iranian bombing of the AMIA building in 1994.

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.