Ephraim Asculai, an expert on atomic energy, details the numerous flaws that render the agreement powerless to prevent the Islamic Republic from continuing work on its nuclear-weapons program (article begins on p. 23):

[According to the terms of the deal], only the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) can ask for access [to a suspected nuclear site], and [even then] it must provide reasons for this request. . . . [B]oth conditions pose serious problems. As an example, let us assume that the U.S. intelligence community receives sensitive source-verified information that Iran is setting up an installation at a hitherto unknown site. The U.S. would then need to convince the IAEA, which would in turn need to divulge this information to Iran. The Iranians would then deny the entire claim and refuse entry to IAEA inspectors at the suspect site and the area around it. In addition, one must remember that the IAEA is not above politics, and there have been past occurrences when its director-general did not act according to the evidence and refused to indict Iran for incidents of non-compliance. . . .

[Furthermore], Iran would have 24 days to prepare for the IAEA’s arrival. This would be insufficient time for hiding or removing large-scale facilities such as nuclear reactors and reprocessing plants. . . . . However, smaller-scale prohibited facilities and activities . . . can be removed and/or hidden from sight within this period. These could include small-scale experimental setups, or computers with relevant software, which could be easily removed before an inspection. For the Iranians this would constitute a cat-and-mouse exercise, but for the inspectors this would be a predestined failure. Only inspections based on the “anywhere, anytime” principle would enable IAEA inspectors to perform their duties satisfactorily.

Israel’s goals of freeing the hostages and defeating Hamas (the latter necessary to prevent further hostage taking) are to some extent contradictory, since Yahya Sinwar, the ruler of the Gaza Strip, will only turn over hostages in exchange for concessions. But Jacob Nagel remains convinced that Jerusalem should continue to pursue both goals:

Only consistent military pressure on Hamas can lead to the hostages’ release, either through negotiation or military operation. There’s little chance of reaching a deal with Hamas using current approaches, including the latest Egyptian proposal. Israeli concessions would only encourage further pressure from Hamas.

There is no incentive for Hamas to agree to a deal, especially since it believes it can achieve its full objectives without one. Unfortunately, many contribute to this belief, mainly from outside of Israel, but also from within.

Recent months saw Israel mistakenly refraining from entering Rafah for several reasons. Initially, the main [reason was to try] to negotiate a deal with Hamas. However, as it became clear that Hamas was uninterested, and its only goal was to return to its situation before October 7—where Hamas and its leadership control Gaza, Israeli forces are out, and there are no changes in the borders—the deal didn’t mature.