The Corker-Cardin act, passed in May, requires that the Iran deal be presented to Congress in its entirety and gives Congress a 30-day window in which to approve or disapprove it. Eugene Kontorovich argues that, until Congress has seen the “side-deals” between Iran and the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the executive branch has not fulfilled the terms of Corker-Cardin, and therefore cannot remove sanctions:

The only reason the president can waive sanctions is because Congress has authorized it. Corker-Cardin modifies and narrows that authorization by conditioning it on congressional review of the entire Iran deal. [In other words], it is delegating to him the power to waive sanctions, provided he allow for congressional review of the deal. . . . Since sanctions are fundamentally in Congress’s exclusive power, [as outlined in Article I of the Constitution], it can certainly narrow the scope of its delegation [of this power to the president] in this way. . . .

Indeed, it would raise massive [questions about Congress’s powers as described in] Article I if Congress cannot condition delegations of foreign commerce and tariff powers on executive actions that allow for meaningful congressional monitoring and review of the delegation and its ongoing wisdom. [Through the Corker-Cardin Act], Congress is not imposing conditions on the executive’s exercise of his powers, but on its exercise of its own powers.

Kontorovich argues that Congress could sue the president over this issue, and notes that “a credible legal challenge to the Iran deal has substantial value to opponents even absent a high chance of ultimate victory.”

Robert Satloff has some harsh words for the U.S. government in this regard, words I take especially seriously because Satloff is someone inclined to political moderation. Why, he asks, have American diplomats failed to achieve anything in their endless rounds of talks in Doha and Cairo? Because

there is simply not enough pressure on Hamas to change course, accept a deal, and release the remaining October 7 hostages, stuck in nightmarish captivity. . . . In this environment, why should Hamas change course?

Publicly, the U.S. should bite the bullet and urge Israel to complete the main battle operations in Gaza—i.e., the Rafah operation—as swiftly and efficiently as possible. We should be assertively assisting with the humanitarian side of this.

Satloff had more to say about the hostages, especially the five American ones, in a speech he gave recently:

I am ashamed—ashamed of how we have allowed the story of the hostages to get lost in the noise of the war that followed their capture; ashamed of how we have permitted their release to be a bargaining chip in some larger political negotiation; ashamed of how we have failed to give them the respect and dignity and our wholehearted demand for Red Cross access and care and medicine that is our normal, usual demand for hostages.

If they were taken by Boko Haram, everyone would know their name. If they were taken by the Taliban, everyone would tie a yellow ribbon around a tree for them. If they were taken by Islamic State, kids would learn about them in school.

It is repugnant to see their freedom as just one item on the bargaining table with Hamas, as though they were chattel. These are Americans—and they deserve to be backed by the full faith and credit of the United States.