Even as the Islamic Republic recently concluded a major deal to purchase aircraft from Boeing (a company that employs a leading Iran-deal advocate as a consultant), and the Obama administration appears committed to drumming up more business for Tehran, the U.S. government’s own money-laundering watchdog, in a welcome move, has decided to keep Iran on its blacklist. Mark Dubowitz and Toby Dershowitz write:

The Financial Action Task Force (FATF), the intergovernmental organization that sets global standards to combat money laundering and finance for terrorism and [nuclear] proliferation, had a clear message for financial institutions last week when it declined to remove the Islamic Republic of Iran from its high-risk blacklist: Iran may say it’s open for business but it’s not yet safe to do it.

FATF’s directive was a clear rejection of the Islamic Republic’s lobbying campaign to legitimize itself as a responsible financial actor. . . . FATF urged its members and all jurisdictions to “advise their financial institutions to apply enhanced due diligence to business relationships and transactions” with Iran.

This enhanced due diligence will prove a nightmare for businesses for important reasons. [Most significantly], many Iranian companies—including entities such as the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), which is sanctioned by the U.S. and the EU—use non-transparent corporate structures and shadow companies to hide their true ownership interests. . . .

Most large banks for now may not be fooled by the Islamic Republic’s rhetoric. They will continue to implement strict countermeasures since FATF requirements are considered the floor [rather than] the ceiling for responsible risk management. Those who care about long-term protection of their assets are not rushing back into Iran because they understand the risks of getting entangled in massive money-laundering, corruption, and terror-financing schemes that pose unmanageable risks to their stakeholders.

While the current Egyptian president, Abdel Fattah el-Sisi, has never been friendly to Hamas, his government has objected strenuously to the Israeli campaign in the southernmost part of the Gaza Strip. Haisam Hassanein explains why:

Cairo has long been playing a double game, holding Hamas terrorists near while simultaneously trying to appear helpful to the United States and Israel. Israel taking control of Rafah threatens Egypt’s ability to exploit the chaos in Gaza, both to generate profits for regime insiders and so Cairo can pose as an indispensable mediator and preserve access to U.S. money and arms.

Egyptian security officials have looked the other way while Hamas and other Palestinian militants dug tunnels on the Egyptian-Gaza border. That gave Cairo the ability to use the situation in Gaza as a tool for regional influence and to ensure Egypt’s role in the Palestinian-Israeli conflict would not be eclipsed by regional competitors such as Qatar and Turkey.

Some elements close to the Sisi regime have benefited from Hamas control over Gaza and the Rafah crossing. Media reports indicate an Egyptian company run by one of Sisi’s close allies is making hundreds of millions of dollars by taxing Gazans fleeing the current conflict.

Moreover, writes Judith Miller, the Gaza war has been a godsend to the entire Egyptian economy, which was in dire straits last fall. Since October 7, the International Monetary Fund has given the country a much-needed injection of cash, since the U.S. and other Western countries believe it is a necessary intermediary and stabilizing force. Cairo therefore sees the continuation of the war, rather than an Israeli victory, as most desirable. Hassanein concludes:

Adding to its financial incentive, the Sisi regime views the Rafah crossing as a crucial card in preserving Cairo’s regional standing. Holding it increases Egypt’s relevance to countries that want to send aid to the Palestinians and ensures Washington stays quiet about Egypt’s gross human-rights violations so it can maintain a stable flow of U.S. assistance and weaponry. . . . No serious effort to turn the page on Hamas will yield the desired results without cutting this umbilical cord between the Sisi regime and Hamas.