In response to revelations that the U.S. delivered $400 million in cash to Iran on the same day that Tehran released five American hostages, the White House has insisted that the money was just “leverage” and not ransom, that the payment and hostage release were frankly disclosed by the president in a January 17 press conference, and that the payment was the wholly unobjectionable remittance of funds owed to Iran since the 1970s. Not only do these claims stretch the limits of credibility, writes Rick Richman, but the American government also seems to be ignoring its forthright legal obligation to pursue the claims of victims of Iranian terror:

[At the January 17 press conference, President Obama] did not disclose that the payment had been made in untraceable foreign cash; nor that it had been delivered . . . to an Iranian airline sanctioned for its connections to Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC); nor that the IRGC may thus have gained control of the cash; nor that the administration lifted sanctions on the airline only the day before; nor that the administration had specifically linked the payment with the release; nor that the release and the payment had been virtually simultaneous. . . .

[Furthermore], in a January 29 letter to Secretary of State [John] Kerry and Treasury Secretary [Jack] Lew, Senator Roy Blunt . . . noted that American courts had found Iran liable for bombings of our embassy and Marine Corps barracks in Beirut in 1983, the Khobar Towers in Saudi Arabia in 1996, and other terror attacks. He cited a finding by the Congressional Research Service that there were some $43.5 billion in unpaid Iranian judgments. He questioned why the administration paid Iran $1.7 billion [of which the $400 million was but the first installment] while those judgments remained outstanding, given the provisions of the Victims of Trafficking and Violence Protection Act [of] 2000.

[That act] . . . directed that “no funds shall be paid to Iran . . . from the Foreign Military Sales Fund [FMS] until such claims [against Iran awarded by U.S. courts] have been dealt with to the satisfaction of the United States.” Senator Blunt’s letter stated that the damages in the cases against Iran “far exceed[ed] the $400 million” in Iran’s FMS account. . . .

[I]f the amount in Iran’s FMS account was far less than the U.S. claims against Iran under VTVPA, why was there any payment to Iran at all?

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.