Earlier this month, Nusra Front, the main al-Qaeda affiliate in Syria, renamed itself Jabhat Fath al-Sham in a public statement that, on its face, would indicate a break with its parent organization. This fits neatly with the conventional wisdom that al-Qaeda has become a second-tier player, unable to keep up with the more popular and powerful Islamic State (IS). But, argue Daveed Gartenstein-Ross and Nathaniel Barr, the conventional wisdom is wrong: al-Qaeda has routed Islamic State in Africa, Afghanistan, and Uzbekistan while establishing important footholds in Yemen, Libya, and elsewhere; meanwhile, the renaming of Nusra Front was likely mostly for show:

Rather than trying to replicate IS’s model, al-Qaeda took the exact opposite approach. Al-Qaeda reduced its public profile, downplayed its successes rather than publicizing them, and embedded further within local populations. In this way, al-Qaeda presented itself to the world as a more palatable alternative to its bloodthirsty rival. . . .

Even when IS was at its peak, the vast majority of al-Qaeda affiliates refused to defect, and instead hunted down and neutralized IS sympathizers. Now that IS is demonstrably losing territory in Syria, Iraq, and Libya all at once, its chances of wooing al-Qaeda affiliates are even further diminished. It is IS’s global network, not al-Qaeda’s, that is now vulnerable to fragmentation. . . .

The alleged dissociation from al-Qaeda [in Syria] may open up [the newly minted] Jabhat Fath al-Sham to deeper cooperation with other rebel groups and greater support from external sponsors. Al-Qaeda theoreticians have made clear that they expect this precise benefit. . . .

Today al-Qaeda seems to be the strongest it has been since 9/11, and is arguably in the best shape it has known in its history.

For some time, opponents of U.S support for Israel have been urging the White House to end the war in Gaza, or simply calling for a ceasefire. Douglas Feith and Lewis Libby consider what such a result would actually entail:

Ending the war immediately would allow Hamas to survive and retain military and governing power. Leaving it in the area containing the Sinai-Gaza smuggling routes would ensure that Hamas can rearm. This is why Hamas leaders now plead for a ceasefire. A ceasefire will provide some relief for Gazans today, but a prolonged ceasefire will preserve Hamas’s bloody oppression of Gaza and make future wars with Israel inevitable.

For most Gazans, even when there is no hot war, Hamas’s dictatorship is a nightmarish tyranny. Hamas rule features the torture and murder of regime opponents, official corruption, extremist indoctrination of children, and misery for the population in general. Hamas diverts foreign aid and other resources from proper uses; instead of improving life for the mass of the people, it uses the funds to fight against Palestinians and Israelis.

Moreover, a Hamas-affiliated website warned Gazans last month against cooperating with Israel in securing and delivering the truckloads of aid flowing into the Strip. It promised to deal with those who do with “an iron fist.” In other words, if Hamas remains in power, it will begin torturing, imprisoning, or murdering those it deems collaborators the moment the war ends. Thereafter, Hamas will begin planning its next attack on Israel:

Hamas’s goals are to overshadow the Palestinian Authority, win control of the West Bank, and establish Hamas leadership over the Palestinian revolution. Hamas’s ultimate aim is to spark a regional war to obliterate Israel and, as Hamas leaders steadfastly maintain, fulfill a Quranic vision of killing all Jews.

Hamas planned for corpses of Palestinian babies and mothers to serve as the mainspring of its October 7 war plan. Hamas calculated it could survive a war against a superior Israeli force and energize enemies of Israel around the world. The key to both aims was arranging for grievous Palestinian civilian losses. . . . That element of Hamas’s war plan is working impressively.