Rather than tear up the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) upon taking office, writes Lee Smith, Donald Trump would do better to follow its terms, and wait for Tehran to renounce it:

The Obama administration told Congress that the deal did not eliminate non-nuclear sanctions, like those related to terrorism, ballistic missiles, and human rights. After it was signed, however, and Iran was emboldened throughout the Middle East, the White House blocked congressional efforts to enforce existing non-nuclear sanctions and impose new ones. If the Trump administration doesn’t block Congress from reinstating and imposing sanctions, as member have wanted to do over the last year, the regime will crash the deal.

The same holds for overlooking Iranian violations of the JCPOA. Last week’s transgression was a repeat of the regime’s February violation of the heavy-water threshold. When the White House coughed up cash for the 32 tons, it legitimized a state sponsor of terror as a nuclear supplier. If the Trump administration merely stops overlooking Iranian violations of the JCPOA, the regime will very likely opt out of President Obama’s chief foreign-policy achievement. . . .

At that point, the next administration will have an important decision to reach, one made even more urgent by the mendacious tactics of its predecessor. What happens if the master of the art of the deal can’t get Iran back to the table for an agreement that better suits American interests? What if the regime pushes ahead with its nuclear-weapons program? Estimates suggest the Iranians are about a year from a nuclear breakout. Will the next White House take action to stop them or will it, too, push a phony agreement and put American citizens, allies, and interests at risk?

If Iran succeeds in obtaining nuclear weapons, the war in Gaza, let alone the protests on college campuses, will seem like a minor complication. Jonathan Schachter fears that this danger could be much more imminent than decisionmakers in Jerusalem and Washington believe. In his view, Israel seems to be repeating the mistake that allowed it to be taken by surprise on Simchat Torah of 2023 and Yom Kippur of 1973: putting too much faith in an intelligence concept that could be wrong.

Israel and the United States apparently believe that despite Iran’s well-documented progress in developing capabilities necessary for producing and delivering nuclear weapons, as well as its extensive and ongoing record of violating its international nuclear obligations, there is no acute crisis because building a bomb would take time, would be observable, and could be stopped by force. Taken together, these assumptions and their moderating impact on Israeli and American policy form a new Iran concept reminiscent of its 1973 namesake and of the systemic failures that preceded the October 7 massacre.

Meanwhile, most of the restrictions put in place by the 2015 nuclear deal will expire by the end of next year, rendering the question of Iran’s adherence moot. And the forces that could be taking action aren’t:

The European Union regularly issues boilerplate press releases asserting its members’ “grave concern.” American decisionmakers and spokespeople have created the unmistakable impression that their reservations about the use of force are stronger than their commitment to use force to prevent an Iranian atomic bomb. At the same time, the U.S. refuses to enforce its own sanctions comprehensively: Iranian oil exports (especially to China) and foreign-currency reserves have ballooned since January 2021, when the Biden administration took office.

Israel’s response has also been sluggish and ambiguous. Despite its oft-stated policy of never allowing a nuclear Iran, Israel’s words and deeds have sent mixed messages to allies and adversaries—perhaps inadvertently reinforcing the prevailing sense in Washington and elsewhere that Iran’s nuclear efforts do not present an exigent crisis.